Julia R. G. v. Saul

Background

Julia R. G. sought judicial review under 42 U.S.C. § 405(g) of the Commissioner of Social Security’s final decision denying her application for Title II disability insurance benefits. The Administrative Law Judge (ALJ) found severe impairments including degenerative disc disease of the lumbar and thoracic spine, chronic mid-thoracic and cervical spine strains, and cervical foraminal stenosis. The ALJ determined that Julia retained the residual functional capacity (RFC)—her ability to work despite her impairments—to perform light work, with no more than occasional stooping, balancing, crouching, crawling, and kneeling. Based on vocational-expert testimony, the ALJ found that she could perform jobs such as cashier, ticket seller, and folder.

Julia moved for summary judgment, asking the court to reverse the administrative decision. The Commissioner filed a cross-motion to affirm. Julia argued that the ALJ improperly discounted the opinion of her treating psychiatrist, Dr. Balaban; rejected her testimony about her symptoms; discounted the testimony of her friend, Jesus Hernandez; made an unsupported Step Five finding about other available work; and was not properly appointed under the Constitution’s Appointments Clause.

Medical opinion evidence

Dr. Balaban treated Julia for depression and panic attacks from May 2016 through April 2017. In a questionnaire, he stated that she was depressed, had panic attacks, and could not currently work, and noted some impaired concentration. The ALJ gave this opinion little weight because it was inconsistent with Dr. Balaban’s treatment notes, which showed clear and goal-directed thought processes, focused and alert cognition, and no significant mental-status deficits other than mood and affect.

The court held that this was a specific and legitimate reason for discounting the opinion. Although Julia identified treatment notes showing mood swings, poor sleep, and panic attacks, the court found that the ALJ was responsible for resolving the conflicting evidence. The court also noted that Dr. Balaban’s opinion was contradicted by Dr. Acenas’s opinion that Julia had no mental work limitations, making the specific-and-legitimate-reasons standard applicable.

Subjective symptom testimony

The ALJ found that Julia’s medically determinable impairments could reasonably cause her alleged symptoms but concluded that her statements about their intensity, persistence, and limiting effects were not entirely consistent with the record. Because the ALJ did not identify evidence of malingering, the court applied the requirement that the ALJ provide specific, clear, and convincing reasons for discounting her testimony.

The court found that the ALJ met that requirement. The ALJ relied on evidence that Julia’s condition responded to treatment, including examinations showing full strength and a normal gait; references indicating that she could work with certain limitations; her reported activities, including working in a light-duty job for approximately six months and performing household chores; and opinions from state-agency physicians and Dr. Mehta that she could perform light work with exertional and postural limits. The court concluded that these reasons, supported by record citations, adequately supported the ALJ’s decision.

Lay witness testimony

Julia argued that the ALJ improperly gave only some weight to a function report from her friend, Jesus Hernandez. The ALJ stated that Hernandez’s statements largely mirrored Julia’s statements and that he lacked medical training to make certain detailed observations. The court held that, together with the ALJ’s reasons for discounting Julia’s testimony, these were sufficient reasons related to this witness for discounting Hernandez’s testimony.

Step Five finding

Julia argued that the hypothetical presented to the vocational expert did not include limitations described by Dr. Balaban, Julia, or Hernandez, or limitations from depression and cervical radiculopathy. The court rejected the arguments concerning Dr. Balaban, Julia, and Hernandez because it had already rejected the underlying challenges to that evidence. The court also noted that the ALJ had not found depression or cervical radiculopathy to be severe impairments, that Julia did not separately challenge that finding, and that she did not explain what work limitations those impairments caused. The court therefore found that the ALJ’s Step Five finding was supported by substantial evidence.

Appointments Clause challenge

Julia argued that the ALJ who conducted her hearing was not properly appointed under the Constitution’s Appointments Clause. The Commissioner did not substantively dispute the argument but contended that Julia had forfeited it by failing to raise it during the administrative process.

The court agreed with the Commissioner. It held that an Appointments Clause challenge is nonjurisdictional and can be forfeited. Applying binding Ninth Circuit precedent requiring Social Security claimants to raise issues at their administrative hearings to preserve them for later review, the court found that Julia had forfeited this challenge.

Disposition

Judge Ryu denied Julia’s motion for summary judgment and granted the Commissioner’s cross-motion. The court left the Commissioner’s denial of benefits in place.