Marie M. v. Saul
- Jacquelyn Corley
- 3:19-cv-07720
- U.S. District Court · Northern District of California
- 10
In Marie M. v. Saul, Judge Corley granted Marie M.’s motion, denied Saul’s cross-motion, and remanded the Social Security benefits case for further proceedings.
Marie M.’s Social Security benefits claim was sent back to the agency for further proceedings; the court did not order benefits to be paid.
What happened
Marie M. asked the court to review the denial of her application for supplemental security income based on physical and mental impairments. The Administrative Law Judge found that she was not disabled.
The court held that the Administrative Law Judge did not adequately explain why he discounted opinions from examining doctors Emily Cohen and Katherine Wiebe. The court upheld the judge’s analysis of the mental-impairment listings but did not decide the challenges to later steps of the disability analysis.
In Marie M. v. Saul, Judge Jacquelyn Scott Corley granted Marie M.’s motion for summary judgment, denied the Commissioner’s cross-motion, and remanded the case for further proceedings. The court did not order benefits to be paid.
The detailed version
- Marie M. v. Saul · No. 3:19-cv-07720
- Jacquelyn Corley
- Mar. 26, 2021
Background
Marie M. sought supplemental security income under Title XVI of the Social Security Act. She alleged disability from a combination of physical and mental impairments, including scoliosis, knee, back, and hand conditions, wrist tendonitis, depression, and migraine headaches. After the Social Security Administration denied her application, an Administrative Law Judge (ALJ) held hearings and determined that she was not disabled. The ALJ found several severe impairments and assigned her a residual functional capacity (RFC), meaning the work-related activities she could still perform despite her impairments. The Appeals Council denied review, making the ALJ’s decision final.
The parties filed cross-motions for summary judgment. Marie M. argued that the ALJ improperly evaluated medical opinions, analyzed her mental impairments under the regulatory listings, and determined her RFC.
Medical-opinion evidence
The court held that the ALJ did not provide legally sufficient reasons for discounting portions of examining physician Emily Cohen’s opinion. The ALJ gave great weight to Dr. Cohen’s conclusion that Marie M. could perform light work but gave less weight to proposed limits on standing, walking, sitting, bending, and use of her left leg. The ALJ explained those limits with one general statement that the clinical or diagnostic evidence did not support them. The court found that this explanation did not identify or connect specific conflicting evidence to the ALJ’s conclusion.
The court also held that the ALJ did not adequately explain why he gave little weight to examining physician Katherine Wiebe’s opinion about Marie M.’s mental limitations. The ALJ described Dr. Wiebe’s findings as internally inconsistent and characterized them as showing no more than moderate limitations. The court found that the ALJ had mischaracterized Dr. Wiebe’s assessment; the assessment classified Marie M. as severe in six of twelve mental-functioning categories, moderate in three, mild in three, and normal in one. Because the ALJ’s reasoning was based in part on that mischaracterization, the court concluded that the stated reasons were not supported by substantial evidence, meaning evidence that a reasonable person could accept as adequate support for the decision.
Mental-impairment listings
The court rejected Marie M.’s challenge to the ALJ’s analysis of Listings 12.04, 12.06, 12.08, and 12.11. Marie M. conceded that she had not presented an argument about the required paragraph A criteria. Because paragraph A was required for each listing at issue, the court held that she had forfeited this challenge. The court did not further review the ALJ’s finding concerning the physical listings because Marie M. had not challenged that finding.
RFC and remedy
Because the ALJ’s errors in weighing the medical evidence could have affected the RFC and the ultimate disability determination, the court found that the errors were not harmless. The court did not reach Marie M.’s arguments about steps four and five of the disability analysis.
Marie M. requested either an award of benefits or a remand for additional proceedings. The court declined to order benefits because the record was not fully developed and outstanding issues remained about her mental functional capacity. The court therefore granted Plaintiff’s motion for summary judgment, denied Defendant’s cross-motion for summary judgment, and remanded for further proceedings consistent with the order.
Read the full 10-page opinion on CourtListener, the free public archive maintained by the Free Law Project.