T.S. v. Commissioner of Social Security

Background

T.S. sought judicial review of the Commissioner of Social Security’s decision denying her application for disability insurance benefits under Title II of the Social Security Act. She alleged disability beginning August 27, 2009, based primarily on right and left shoulder injuries. The administrative law judge found that she had severe impairments consisting of morbid obesity and the condition following repair of a right rotator cuff tear. The judge determined that T.S. could perform a limited range of light work and could perform her past work as a systems analyst. The judge therefore found that she was not disabled through her last insured date, March 31, 2014.

T.S. argued that the administrative law judge improperly evaluated her symptom testimony, medical opinions from Drs. Sidhu and Sacco, and her claim that she was disabled for a closed period from August 27, 2009, through October 12, 2012. Both parties moved for summary judgment, which asks the court to decide the case based on the record without a trial.

Symptom Testimony

The court applied the rule that, when there is no evidence of malingering, an administrative law judge must give specific, clear, and convincing reasons for rejecting a claimant’s testimony about the severity of symptoms after the claimant establishes an underlying impairment that could produce those symptoms.

The court upheld the administrative law judge’s partial discounting of T.S.’s testimony about limitations in sitting, standing, and walking. The judge reasonably relied on the absence of supporting findings for chiropractor Dr. Ramin Shiva’s opinion that T.S. could sit, stand, and walk for less than four hours in an eight-hour workday, as well as conflicts with other medical opinions and the record as a whole.

The court reached a different conclusion about T.S.’s alleged limitations in lifting and carrying. The Commissioner offered several possible reasons for discounting that testimony, including T.S.’s testimony that she was ambidextrous, normal nerve-conduction studies, a doctor’s concerns about the relationship between her tenderness and test effort, and a comment that her home-exercise program should be more aggressive. The court found that these reasons were not clear and convincing. It also could not determine how the administrative law judge evaluated the evidence on this part of the testimony. The court therefore remanded for further proceedings on lifting and carrying.

Medical Opinions

T.S. argued that the administrative law judge failed to provide adequate reasons for giving little weight to opinions from treating physicians Dr. Sidhu and Dr. Sacco. Those doctors had issued earlier opinions restricting or barring lifting and other work involving T.S.’s right arm. The administrative law judge found their opinions inconsistent with T.S.’s later report that she could lift 10 pounds and with her demonstrated ability to carry 20 pounds for 100 feet in November 2012.

The court found no error in this part of the decision. To the extent the opinions were evaluated as evidence of current or continuing disability, the administrative law judge rationally considered T.S.’s more recent reports of improved ability.

Closed Period of Disability

T.S. also argued that the administrative law judge failed to consider whether she was disabled only during a limited period ending October 12, 2012. She pointed to physical therapy, two surgeries, recovery periods, and testimony from a vocational expert that missing three workdays per month would prevent a person from performing her past relevant work.

Because the administrative law judge made no findings about T.S.’s alleged absenteeism, the court directed the judge on remand to assess whether T.S. was disabled during the proposed closed period. That assessment must account for any changes in the evaluation of her pain testimony and the vocational expert’s testimony about missing three workdays per month.

Disposition

The court rejected T.S.’s request for an immediate award of benefits under the credit-as-true doctrine because further administrative proceedings were necessary. Magistrate Judge Demarch granted in part and denied in part T.S.’s motion for summary judgment, granted in part and denied in part the Commissioner’s cross-motion for summary judgment, and remanded the matter for further administrative proceedings consistent with the order. The clerk was directed to enter judgment and close the file.