Brown v. United States

Background

Alice Helen Brown filed two requests asking the court to reconsider orders entered on March 4, 2021. One earlier order explained why the court had denied Brown’s motion to disqualify Judge Illman. The other dismissed the case based on an earlier order granting summary judgment to the defendants. Summary judgment is a decision that resolves claims when the court determines that the evidence does not establish a legally sufficient dispute requiring a trial.

Disqualification request

Brown argued that Judge Illman had to step aside under 28 U.S.C. § 455(b)(3) because he had previously served as a law clerk to Judge Vadas, the original judge assigned to the case. That statute addresses situations in which a judge previously worked for the government as counsel, adviser, or a material witness concerning the same proceeding, or expressed an opinion about its merits.

Judge Illman stated that Brown had not identified, and the court had not found, a case requiring disqualification when a former law clerk later becomes a judge and receives a case that had previously been assigned to the judge for whom the clerk worked. The court relied on persuasive decisions concluding that a law clerk’s work in a judge’s chambers does not ordinarily constitute the type of adversarial government employment covered by the statute. The court also stated that Judge Illman had never served in such an adversarial position and had never expressed the type of opinion covered by the statute. It therefore denied reconsideration of the order denying disqualification.

Request to reconsider summary judgment

Brown argued that the court should reconsider the earlier summary-judgment ruling because of an intervening change in controlling law, relying particularly on Martin v. City of Boise. Martin held that an ordinance violates the Eighth Amendment when it criminally punishes homeless people for sleeping outdoors on public property when no alternative shelter is available.

The court found Martin materially different. According to the opinion, Brown was arrested and convicted under California Penal Code § 148 for resisting, delaying, or obstructing a police officer, and her conviction was upheld on appeal. The court described evidence that a park ranger initially sought to identify Brown and direct her to a nearby retail parking lot that allowed campers. The court stated that Brown refused to open her van or leave it, later refused commands to stop rummaging in the front seat, and refused commands to get on the ground. The court concluded that her arrest and conviction were not based on sleeping outdoors or homelessness when no alternative shelter was available. It therefore ruled that Martin did not apply and denied reconsideration on that ground.

Brown also referred to a settlement in another case that included training for park rangers concerning encounters with people with mental-health concerns. The court ruled that this reference did not identify a basis for reconsideration under the applicable standards, such as a legal or factual error, newly available evidence, manifest injustice, or an intervening change in controlling law. The court further stated that the opinion contained no evidence or suggestion that Brown had a mental illness and that the unrelated settlement did not cast doubt on her arrest or conviction.

Brown also cited proposed legislation concerning qualified immunity. The court stated that Congress had not abolished qualified immunity and that the earlier summary-judgment ruling had not relied on qualified immunity. Instead, the earlier ruling had found no violation of Brown’s federal rights, including because there was probable cause to believe she had violated applicable regulations and California Penal Code § 148(a)(1). The court concluded that eliminating qualified immunity would not have changed the outcome.

Disposition

Judge Robert M. Illman denied Brown’s motions for reconsideration. The opinion does not state that either motion was denied with or without prejudice.