Galia v. Wasatch Advantage Group LLC

Background

Tommy Galia, proceeding without a lawyer, sued Wasatch Advantage Group LLC, Chris Doe, Alicia Cortes, and ten individuals identified as Does 1–10. He asserted one claim under § 3617 of the Fair Housing Act, which prohibits coercion, intimidation, threats, or interference with rights protected by the Act.

Galia alleged that he had a deformed left ankle and mental-health issues that substantially limited his ability to walk and interact socially. He received monthly Social Security disability payments on the second Wednesday of each month. He alleged that he asked to pay rent after receiving those payments rather than at the beginning of the month, so he could avoid late fees. According to the complaint, an individual identified as Chris Doe initially agreed to waive a $50 late fee in exchange for Galia paying an additional $50 toward rent.

Galia alleged that a Wasatch employee denied a similar request in 2014. He was late paying rent in 22 of 38 months between September 2014 and October 2017, although he alleged that late fees were not always charged. In October 2017, Wasatch served him with an unlawful-detainer summons and complaint. In November 2017, he signed an agreement to pay $2,814.99 and leave the apartment. He later asked Alicia Cortes to change the first payment date in that agreement from December 6 to December 8, when he expected to receive his disability payment. He alleged that Cortes refused. A California state court issued a possession order for the apartment on December 21, 2017.

The Motion

The defendants moved to dismiss under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6), arguing that Galia had not alleged discriminatory conduct. They argued that the eviction resulted from unpaid rent rather than discriminatory intent and that § 3617 did not cover conduct that merely interfered with a person’s enjoyment of a home.

They also argued that the Fair Housing Act claim was barred by its two-year statute of limitations because Galia filed the federal lawsuit on December 16, 2019, and the alleged discriminatory conduct had ended earlier. In the alternative, they sought dismissal under Rules 12(b)(2) and 12(b)(5), arguing that the court lacked personal jurisdiction because the complaint was not served within the required period and that service was defective. Galia did not file an opposition.

Court’s Analysis

Service and personal jurisdiction. The court rejected the challenge based on delayed service. Rule 4(m) generally requires service within 90 days, but it also requires the court to extend the deadline when the plaintiff shows good cause. The court found good cause because the delay resulted from circumstances beyond Galia’s control, including the fact that the court had ordered the United States Marshal to serve the complaint. The court therefore rejected the defendants’ argument under Rules 12(b)(2) and 12(b)(5).

Sufficiency of the Fair Housing Act allegations. For a motion under Rule 12(b)(6), the court tests whether the complaint alleges enough facts to support a legally recognized claim. The court generally accepts factual allegations as true and views them favorably to the plaintiff at this stage. It also construes a self-represented litigant’s pleading liberally, while not supplying essential facts that the litigant failed to allege.

The court explained that the Fair Housing Act requires reasonable accommodations to rules, policies, practices, or services when an accommodation may be necessary to give a person with a disability an equal opportunity to use and enjoy a home. To state a basic failure-to-accommodate claim, a plaintiff must allege a disability covered by the Act, the defendant’s knowledge or expected knowledge of the disability, the possible necessity of the accommodation, and the defendant’s refusal to provide it.

The court found Galia’s allegations sufficient to meet that standard at the pleading stage. He alleged that he had a covered disability, that he requested a later rent-payment date because of when he received disability payments, and that the defendants denied his requests in 2014 and 2017. The court also found that the requested change could be necessary to give him an equal opportunity to use and enjoy the apartment. It relied in part on Ninth Circuit authority recognizing that a housing provider may sometimes need to make an exception to a neutral policy when the policy adversely affects disabled people because of financial limitations.

The court further held that Galia adequately alleged interference under § 3617. It found that the unlawful-detainer case, the three-day notice to pay rent or leave, and the pay-and-vacate agreement could plausibly have resulted at least partly from Galia’s repeated late payments and the defendants’ refusal to change the rent-payment date. The court rejected the defendants’ argument that the attached documents conclusively showed that the eviction was unrelated to the accommodation requests, explaining that the issue involved factual disputes better addressed later.

Statute of limitations. The court rejected the argument that the claim was untimely as a matter of law. It explained that the Fair Housing Act’s two-year period can apply from the last occurrence or termination of a continuing discriminatory practice. The court treated the unlawful-detainer action and pay-and-vacate agreement as interference for purposes of the § 3617 claim and concluded that the alleged interference ended no sooner than the December 21, 2017 possession order. Because Galia filed the complaint on December 16, 2019, the court found that the claim was not time-barred on the face of the complaint.

Disposition

The court DENIED the defendants’ motion to dismiss. The opinion did not resolve disputed facts or decide whether Galia would ultimately prevail on his Fair Housing Act claim. It stated that a case-management conference would address the possibility of mediation.