J.H. v. County of San Mateo
- Vince Chhabria
- 3:20-cv-00961
- U.S. District Court · Northern District of California
- 7
In J.H. v. County of San Mateo, Judge Chhabria granted in part and denied in part dismissal, denied striking, and granted and denied sealing motions.
J.H.’s substantive due process, negligence, Bane Act, and California Government Code section 815.6 claims continue, while the procedural due process and Monell claims were dismissed; the defendants’ motion to strike was denied and the sealing motions received different dispositions.
What happened
In J.H. v. County of San Mateo, the defendants asked the court to dismiss claims arising from J.H.’s placement in foster care and to consider documents from J.H.’s juvenile case. The court said those documents generally could not be used to challenge the truth of the complaint at this stage.
The court allowed J.H.’s claims for substantive due process, negligence, interference with rights under California’s Bane Act, and breach of mandatory duties to continue. It rejected J.H.’s procedural due process claim because the cited state laws required procedures but did not require a particular substantive result. It also rejected the claim against San Mateo County based on an alleged county policy or practice because the complaint did not provide enough facts.
Judge Chhabria granted in part and denied in part the motion to dismiss, denied the motion to strike the requests for punitive and treble damages, and granted and denied the motions to seal. The dismissed claims were dismissed without leave to amend, although the court said J.H. could seek permission to add a county-policy claim if discovery revealed a specific factual basis.
The detailed version
- J.H. v. County of San Mateo · No. 3:20-cv-00961
- Vince Chhabria
- Apr. 16, 2021
Background
J.H. sued San Mateo County and individual social workers over J.H.’s placement with Dawson and the social workers’ alleged failures to investigate, monitor, report, or prevent contact with J.H.’s biological father. The defendants moved to dismiss the second amended complaint and submitted documents from J.H.’s juvenile case file. They argued that the documents showed that some laws did not apply and that several allegations were untrue.
The court held that the documents generally could not be considered on a motion to dismiss. The complaint did not expressly refer to the foster-care application materials or the social workers’ notes, and it did not necessarily rely on them. The court also denied judicial notice of disputed information in minute orders from J.H.’s juvenile proceedings. It granted judicial notice of documents relating to Dawson’s criminal proceedings. The court emphasized that, at the motion-to-dismiss stage, it had to assume the complaint’s factual allegations were true and decide only whether they plausibly stated claims for relief.
Claims
Substantive due process. The court held that J.H. adequately alleged a constitutional claim against the individual social workers. A foster child asserting this type of claim must allege deliberate indifference: an objectively substantial risk of harm, the officials’ awareness of facts supporting that risk, and their actual or reasonable inference that the risk existed. The court found that J.H.’s allegations, if true, could show deliberate indifference in the placement with Dawson and the later failure to respond to possible abuse, neglect, health problems, or prohibited visits by J.H.’s biological father.
Procedural due process. The court held that J.H. did not adequately allege this claim. The cited California laws required officials to consider factors, conduct an inspection, provide notice, or report suspected abuse. They did not mandate a particular substantive outcome after those steps. The court therefore granted the motion to dismiss this claim.
Section 1983 municipal-liability claim. J.H. alleged that San Mateo County was liable under Section 1983 based on unconstitutional customs, policies, ratification, or inadequate training. The court held that these allegations were conclusory. Allegations about two officials’ conduct in one case did not establish a widespread county policy or practice or a county-wide failure to train. The court therefore granted the motion to dismiss the Monell claim, while noting that J.H. could seek leave to add such a claim if discovery revealed a specific factual basis.
California claims. The court held that J.H. plausibly stated a claim under California Civil Code section 52.1, commonly called the Bane Act. It ruled that the alleged constitutional violation itself could supply the required coercion if the defendants acted with the required specific intent, which could be shown through recklessness. The court also held that J.H. adequately stated a claim under California Government Code section 815.6 for breach of mandatory duties and adequately stated a negligence claim. Arguments based on statutory immunity and materials outside the complaint were not appropriate to resolve at this stage. The court said immunity could be considered on summary judgment.
Other motions and disposition
The motion to strike J.H.’s requests for punitive and treble damages was denied.
The motions to seal the second amended complaint and opposition brief, docket entries 38 and 44, were denied. J.H. was ordered to file unredacted versions of both documents within seven days. The motions to seal at docket entries 30 and 41 were granted.
The defendants’ motion to dismiss was granted in part and denied in part: it was denied as to the substantive due process, negligence, Bane Act, and section 815.6 claims, and granted as to the procedural due process and Monell claims. The court stated that dismissal of those claims was without leave to amend, subject to the stated possibility of seeking leave to add a Monell claim if discovery provided a specific factual basis. Judge Vince Chhabria also scheduled an initial case-management conference for May 12 at 2 p.m.
Read the full 7-page opinion on CourtListener, the free public archive maintained by the Free Law Project.