Lloyd B. v. Saul

Background

Lloyd B. applied for Social Security Disability Insurance benefits under Title II of the Social Security Act. He alleged that he became disabled on April 9, 2012, after falling approximately 25 feet down an elevator shaft and suffering pelvic fractures and other injuries. The application was denied initially and on reconsideration. After a hearing, an administrative law judge (ALJ) issued an unfavorable decision.

The ALJ found that Lloyd B. had severe impairments including tinnitus, multiple pelvic fractures, degenerative joint disease in both hips, thoracic-spine changes, and conductive hearing loss. The ALJ determined that Lloyd B. retained the capacity for a restricted range of sedentary work, with limits on lifting, sitting, standing, walking, climbing, postural activities, and work around dangerous machinery. Based on a vocational expert’s testimony, the ALJ concluded that Lloyd B. could perform jobs such as document preparer, addresser, and stuffer.

After the Social Security Appeals Council denied review, Lloyd B. asked the district court to reverse the Commissioner’s decision. Lloyd B. moved for summary judgment, and the Commissioner cross-moved to affirm.

Medical-opinion evidence

Lloyd B. argued that the ALJ gave too little weight to the opinions of his treating orthopedic physician, Dr. Eric Fulkerson. Dr. Fulkerson treated Lloyd B. after the 2012 injury and documented pain, reduced hip movement, an antalgic gait, limited mobility, and back spasms. Dr. Fulkerson placed restrictions on Lloyd B.’s work, including limits on hours, lifting, bending, stooping, squatting, and the need for frequent position changes.

The ALJ stated that the residual functional capacity accounted for Dr. Fulkerson’s August 2013 restriction requiring a 10-minute position change every hour. But the RFC actually allowed only five minutes of standing after each hour of sitting. The court found that the ALJ did not explain this difference. The court also found the error was not harmless because the vocational expert testified that about 48 minutes of off-task time per workday was the limit for the identified jobs. The five-minute-per-hour restriction totaled 40 minutes in an eight-hour day, while Dr. Fulkerson’s 10-minute-per-hour restriction totaled 80 minutes and would have prevented Lloyd B. from performing those jobs.

The court also rejected the ALJ’s reasoning that Lloyd B.’s functioning had improved over time. The ALJ relied on less restrictive opinions from other physicians but did not identify specific clinical evidence showing improved functioning. The court characterized that reasoning as circular and held that the ALJ did not provide the required specific and legitimate reasons for discounting Dr. Fulkerson’s opinions.

Pain testimony

Lloyd B. also challenged the ALJ’s partial rejection of his testimony about the severity of his pain. The ALJ relied on four reasons: an alleged report that Lloyd B. could lift heavy items, his part-time work as a Lyft driver, delays in physical therapy, and imaging showing only mild to moderate degenerative changes.

The court found that the record did not show Lloyd B. had reported being able to lift heavy things after his injury. His testimony was that he sometimes lifted bags or luggage while driving for Lyft, generally no more than 10 to 20 pounds, and asked passengers to help with anything heavier. The court also found that his part-time Lyft work did not establish an ability to work full time because he drove only two to three hours a day, could choose his hours, and stopped when his pain became severe.

The court rejected the ALJ’s reliance on delayed physical therapy because Lloyd B. had completed extensive therapy after his injury, continued receiving other treatment, and had experienced limited benefit from earlier therapy. Finally, although the imaging showed mild to moderate abnormalities, the court held that the ALJ could not reject pain testimony solely because the objective imaging did not fully support the reported severity of the symptoms.

Disposition

The court held that the ALJ erred in partially discounting Dr. Fulkerson’s opinions and in making a partially adverse finding about Lloyd B.’s pain testimony. Judge Ryu granted Lloyd B.’s motion for summary judgment, denied the Commissioner’s cross-motion, directed the clerk to enter judgment for Lloyd B. against the Commissioner, and remanded the case for further administrative proceedings.