Kyle Zoellner v. Eric Losey

Background

Kyle C. Zoellner sued the City of Arcata, several City police officers, and several City officials. He alleged that he was unlawfully arrested, detained, and prosecuted for the stabbing death of Josiah Lawson, even though he contended that the evidence did not link him to the stabbing. The state court dismissed the criminal case at a preliminary hearing in May 2017 for lack of probable cause. Zoellner alleged that police then continued investigating him as the primary suspect, and that a grand jury later declined to indict him.

The defendants moved under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6), which permits dismissal when a complaint does not allege enough facts to state a legally plausible claim. The motion challenged only some of the claims in the fifth amended complaint.

Count 4: Policymaker ratification against the City

The court dismissed Count 4 with prejudice. A municipality may be liable under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 when an official policy, widespread practice, failure to train, or final policymaker’s decision causes a constitutional injury. The court had previously allowed Zoellner to amend only a theory that a final policymaker ratified a subordinate’s unconstitutional conduct; it had not allowed him to reassert policy or failure-to-train theories.

The court rejected Zoellner’s attempt to include those other theories. It also found that he had not plausibly alleged ratification by the police chiefs, City Manager, or City Vice Mayor. The court concluded that the chiefs were plausibly final policymakers for arrests and detentions but had not been shown to have final authority over prosecution decisions. It further concluded that the allegations did not show that the City officials approved or adopted unconstitutional conduct.

Count 5: Supervisory liability

The court dismissed Count 5 with prejudice. Section 1983 does not impose liability on supervisors merely because they supervise employees. A supervisor must have been personally involved in the constitutional violation or have a sufficient causal connection to it.

The court concluded that Zoellner had not adequately pleaded a failure-to-train theory. As to ratification, the court found insufficient allegations that Chief Chapman knew the relevant facts before the state court’s probable-cause ruling. After that ruling, Zoellner was no longer detained, and the continued investigation was not itself a prosecution. Although Chief Ahearn allegedly recommended that Zoellner be prosecuted again, the court found no actual later prosecution on which a malicious-prosecution theory could be based.

Count 6: Defamation

The court dismissed Count 6 in part. The claim was dismissed as to all defendants except Chief Chapman, Detective Sergeant Dokweiler, and the City, and the order states that the dismissal was with prejudice as to the dismissed defendants.

The court held that Chapman’s statement to the press about a white man stabbing and killing a Black man could implicate Zoellner even though it did not name him. The court found that one statement attributed to Dokweiler—that Zoellner took part in the fight allegedly leading to Lawson’s death—was not defamatory because the fight was undisputed and the statement used the word “allegedly.” But the court found that Dokweiler’s separate statement claiming that numerous witnesses said Zoellner had stabbed Lawson was potentially defamatory. Only that statement by Dokweiler could support the remaining defamation claim.

Counts 7 and 8: Petitioning rights and policymaker ratification

The court dismissed Counts 7 and 8 with prejudice. These claims were based on allegations that defense counsel threatened new criminal charges unless Zoellner agreed to dismiss this lawsuit. The court rejected the argument that the alleged statements could not be considered because they occurred during settlement discussions, explaining that the claims concerned alleged wrongdoing during negotiations rather than the validity of the claims being negotiated.

The court nevertheless found that Zoellner had not explained how statements by defense counsel could be attributed to the defendants under § 1983. The allegations did not show which defendants were present, whether anyone adopted the statements, or whether any person who did so had final policymaking authority for the City. The court concluded that amendment would be futile and dismissed both § 1983 counts with prejudice.

Count 9: Wrongful threat of criminal prosecution

The court denied the motion to dismiss Count 9. It treated the state-law claim labeled “wrongful threat of criminal prosecution” as a claim for intentional infliction of emotional distress because the complaint alleged emotional distress and other injuries from the alleged threat. The court did not decide whether Zoellner could ultimately prove every element, including severe or extreme emotional distress.

Disposition

The court granted in part and denied in part the defendants’ motion to dismiss. Count 4 and Count 5 were dismissed with prejudice. Count 6 was dismissed in part, with the claim continuing against Chief Chapman, Detective Sergeant Dokweiler, and the City, subject to the limitations described above. Counts 7 and 8 were dismissed with prejudice. Count 9 was allowed to proceed at that stage. The order disposed of Docket No. 107. Judge Edward M. Chen signed the order.