Dew v. City of Seaside

Background

As successors-in-interest of Brandon Virtue, the plaintiffs sued Seaside Police Chief Abdul Pridgen, former Seaside Police Officer Manuel Fernandez, and the City of Seaside. They asserted claims under 42 U.S.C. § 1983, a federal law allowing civil-rights lawsuits against state actors, along with state-law claims.

The case concerned Fernandez’s shooting of Virtue on September 20, 2018. Officers were pursuing Virtue after he drove away during an attempted traffic stop. Fernandez joined the pursuit, and Virtue’s SUV eventually stopped on an embankment. Virtue then ran along the embankment while Fernandez pursued him with his gun drawn. Fernandez said he saw Virtue make gestures that he perceived as showing a gun and threatening to shoot. The plaintiffs argued that Virtue’s hands were empty, that he was running away, and that Fernandez shot him in the back without giving a warning. A tool battery, rather than a gun, was found in Virtue’s sweatshirt pocket.

The shooting caused a complete spinal-cord injury resulting in paraplegia. Virtue later took his own life. The plaintiffs alleged excessive force under the Fourth Amendment, deprivation of substantive due process under the Fourteenth Amendment, municipal liability based on an unconstitutional city policy or custom, and failure to supervise and train.

Excessive Force and Qualified Immunity

The court applied the Fourth Amendment’s objective-reasonableness test, which requires balancing the seriousness of the force against the government’s need to use it. Viewing the evidence in the plaintiffs’ favor, the court found a genuine factual dispute about whether Virtue was facing away from Fernandez, had empty hands, was running away, and received no warning before being shot. A jury could therefore find that Fernandez violated Virtue’s constitutional right by using excessive and unjustified force.

The court nevertheless granted summary judgment based on qualified immunity. Qualified immunity protects government officials from damages when their conduct did not violate a constitutional right that was clearly established at the time. The court concluded that the plaintiffs’ cited cases did not involve sufficiently similar circumstances—particularly a suspect fleeing on foot after a vehicle collision—to make the unlawfulness of Fernandez’s actions clear beyond debate. The court therefore held that Fernandez was entitled to qualified immunity, even though it noted that several factual issues would otherwise benefit from a jury’s assessment.

Substantive Due Process

The plaintiffs also claimed that Fernandez violated their Fourteenth Amendment right to familial companionship. The court held that the plaintiffs had not produced enough evidence for a jury to find that Fernandez’s conduct “shocked the conscience,” which is required for this type of substantive due process claim. The court additionally held that qualified immunity applied because no clearly established law would have put Fernandez on notice that his conduct violated the Fourteenth Amendment. The court granted summary judgment on this claim.

Municipal Liability

The plaintiffs pursued a municipal-liability claim against the City of Seaside under Monell v. Department of Social Services. To prevail under this theory, a plaintiff must show that an official city policy or custom caused the constitutional injury. The plaintiffs relied on ratification, arguing that the city approved Fernandez’s conduct through its internal investigation, which concluded that his use of force was reasonable and did not violate department policy.

The court held that an after-the-fact internal investigation, standing alone, was insufficient to establish ratification. The plaintiffs also pointed to Fernandez’s personnel file and argued that leaving alleged deficiencies unpunished encouraged the conduct. But the court found that this evidence did not create a triable issue on municipal liability. It granted summary judgment on the Monell claim and on the failure-to-supervise-and-train claim identified in the conclusion.

Disposition

The court granted the defendants’ motion for summary judgment on the plaintiffs’ federal claims for excessive force, substantive due process, municipal liability, and failure to supervise and train. Because no federal claims remained, the court declined to exercise supplemental jurisdiction over the remaining state-law claims and dismissed those claims without prejudice to the plaintiffs’ asserting them in state court. The clerk was directed to enter judgment for the defendants and close the case.