Mario V. v. Alisal Union School District

Background

This putative class action arose from blood-sugar testing that elementary school teacher Henry Armenta performed on students after school. Armenta taught fifth grade and operated an after-school homework program. He offered blood-sugar testing to students who volunteered, used a finger-pricking device, and rewarded participating children with drinks, snacks, and other treats. He did not notify the children’s parents or obtain parental consent.

The school principal, Diana Garcia, learned of the testing on February 6, 2017, according to her declaration, after parents reported it. Garcia reported the information to the school district, Child Protective Services, and the Salinas Police Department, interviewed students, and directed Armenta to report to the school district. Armenta has not taught at the school since that date.

The school and school district were later dismissed from the case. The remaining defendants, Armenta and Garcia, were sued in their individual capacities. The operative complaint asserted two claims under 42 U.S.C. § 1983, a federal civil-rights law. Claim 1 alleged that both defendants violated the plaintiffs’ Fourteenth Amendment right to family association. Claim 2, asserted only against Armenta, alleged that he violated the minor plaintiffs’ Fourth Amendment rights.

Garcia’s Motion

The plaintiffs argued that Garcia violated their right to family association by knowing about Armenta’s conduct and failing to stop or correct it. Garcia argued that she did not know about the testing before the named minor plaintiffs were tested and that allegations that she “should have known” were insufficient. The plaintiffs abandoned the “should have known” theory in their opposition brief.

The evidence created a factual dispute about whether a parent had reported the testing to a school receptionist during the 2015–2016 school year and whether the receptionist had then informed Garcia. The court concluded, however, that this dispute did not affect the result. The evidence showed that two named minor plaintiffs were tested only once, the day before the parent’s call, while the other two could not remember when they were tested. There was no evidence that the named minor plaintiffs were tested after Garcia allegedly learned of the conduct.

The court held that without evidence that Garcia knew about the testing before the named plaintiffs were tested, no reasonable jury could find her liable for violating their Fourteenth Amendment rights. The court therefore granted Garcia’s motion for summary judgment. The court separately denied Garcia’s alternative motion for summary judgment based on the argument that the minor plaintiffs lacked a protected liberty interest, because the court concluded that Claim 1, read broadly, included the minor plaintiffs’ right to have their parents make medical decisions for them and to have family association during medical procedures.

Armenta’s Motion

Armenta joined Garcia’s motion. The court rejected his argument that summary judgment was warranted because California Education Code § 48200 did not create a Fourteenth Amendment liberty interest in a safe school campus. The plaintiffs had abandoned that statutory theory, but the court determined that Claim 1 still included a claim based on the Fourteenth Amendment right to family association for both the parents and the children.

The court concluded that Armenta was not entitled to summary judgment on Claim 1 and denied Armenta’s motion for summary judgment. Although the opinion identifies Claim 2 as a separate Fourth Amendment claim against Armenta, the court did not separately analyze that claim in the discussion quoted here.

Disposition

The order states: (1) Garcia’s motion for summary judgment is granted; (2) Armenta’s motion for summary judgment is denied; and (3) the order terminates the two listed motions.