Smith v. Berryhill

Background

Bobbie Jane Smith appealed the Social Security Administration’s denial of her applications for disability insurance benefits and supplemental security income. In an earlier order, the court granted in part and denied in part the parties’ cross-motions for summary judgment and remanded the matter for further proceedings. After the remand, Smith was awarded supplemental security income benefits for May 2013 through June 2020 and $45,214.12 in past-due benefits.

Smith’s attorney, Robert C. Weems, moved under 42 U.S.C. § 406(b) for fees for his work before the court. The fee agreement provided that he would seek no more than 25% of Smith’s past-due benefits. Weems requested $4,803.53, calculated as the $11,378.03 fee produced by the agreement minus $6,500 in Equal Access to Justice Act fees that Smith could have received but that were never awarded. The Commissioner took no position on the reasonableness of the request. After the court ordered service of the motion and supporting papers, Smith did not respond, and the court inferred that she did not oppose the request.

Legal standard

Section 406(b) permits a court to award a reasonable fee to an attorney who represented a Social Security claimant before the court, subject to a limit of 25% of the claimant’s past-due benefits. The court must independently review a contingency-fee agreement to ensure that it produces a reasonable result. Relevant considerations include the quality of the representation, whether the attorney caused delay to increase the fee, whether the fee is excessive compared with the benefits obtained, and the risk the attorney assumed. Any fee awarded under § 406(b) must be offset by fees awarded under the Equal Access to Justice Act.

Court’s analysis

The court found the requested amount reasonable. The fee agreement did not exceed the 25% statutory limit. The court expressed concern that Smith’s summary-judgment filings were not timely and that requests for extensions did not adequately explain the delays. The court also noted that the attorney’s office did not begin reviewing the administrative record until after the initial filing deadline and did not begin drafting the summary-judgment motion until shortly before the later deadline.

The court nevertheless found that the resulting delay was minimal because the court denied the requested extensions. Although the court had ruled against Smith on all but one part of one of her six summary-judgment arguments, the attorney ultimately achieved a favorable result by obtaining a remand. The court found that the discounted request was not excessive because it represented 10.6% of Smith’s past-due benefits, and the attorney and his staff had spent approximately 50 hours on the case, producing an effective hourly rate of less than $100. The court also found that the attorney had assumed a substantial risk of receiving no fee because he accepted the case after earlier administrative denials and could not know that the appeal would result in a remand.

Disposition

Judge Demarchi granted Robert C. Weems’s motion for fees. The Commissioner was directed to certify $4,803.53 under 42 U.S.C. § 406(b), payable to Robert C. Weems, Attorney at Law. The order also required Weems to promptly serve Smith with a copy of the order.