Tradeshift, Inc. v. BuyerQuest, Inc.
- Richard Seeborg
- 3:20-cv-01294
- U.S. District Court · Northern District of California
- 4
In Tradeshift v. BuyerQuest, Judge Hixson denied Tradeshift’s motion to compel another deposition of BuyerQuest’s CEO.
Tradeshift, Inc. and BuyerQuest, Inc., including BuyerQuest’s CEO, Jack Mulloy, in the conduct of the Rule 30(b)(6) deposition.
What happened
Tradeshift, Inc. asked the court to require BuyerQuest, Inc. to produce its CEO, Jack Mulloy, for another deposition about four topics involving BuyerQuest, Smucker, and Tradeshift’s replacement, and to pay Tradeshift’s costs. Tradeshift argued that Mulloy had not prepared adequately; BuyerQuest argued that he knew the topics and that another topic was improper.
The court ruled that topics 4 through 7 were proper deposition topics, but found that Tradeshift had not shown that Mulloy could not answer substantive questions about them. The court found topic 14 improper because it sought legal contentions about the factual bases for BuyerQuest’s defenses from a lay witness, and because Tradeshift asked questions in that improper form.
Judge Thomas S. Hixson denied Tradeshift’s motion to compel.
The detailed version
- Tradeshift, Inc. v. BuyerQuest, Inc. · No. 3:20-cv-01294
- Richard Seeborg
- June 2, 2021
Background
Tradeshift moved to compel BuyerQuest to produce its CEO, Jack Mulloy, for another deposition as BuyerQuest’s designated witness under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 30(b)(6). The motion concerned topics 4 through 7 and topic 14. Tradeshift also asked BuyerQuest to pay the fees and costs of bringing the motion. Tradeshift said it would accept a different witness who knew the subjects if Rule 30 permitted that approach. BuyerQuest argued that Mulloy was sufficiently knowledgeable about topics 4 through 7 and that topic 14 was improper.
The court noted that Tradeshift had violated the court’s Discovery Standing Order by including an argument section longer than allowed in the joint discovery letter brief, but it considered the motion on its merits.
Topics 4 Through 7
Topics 4 through 7 concerned communications and presentations involving BuyerQuest, Smucker, and Tradeshift. They addressed communications about Tradeshift, plans for BuyerQuest to take over the project, Smucker’s right to end its relationship with Tradeshift, and presentations about plans for BuyerQuest to take over the project. The court held that these were acceptable Rule 30(b)(6) topics because they described the matters for examination with reasonable particularity.
The court nevertheless found that Tradeshift had not shown that Mulloy was unprepared. Tradeshift did not identify a substantive question within topics 4 through 7 that Mulloy could not answer. BuyerQuest submitted more than 120 pages of Mulloy’s testimony showing extensive testimony about those topics. The court explained that Rule 30(b)(6) does not impose a fixed number of preparation hours, documents, or interviews. The required preparation depends on the topics and the witness’s existing knowledge and memory. The relevant showing is that the witness could not fairly answer questions within the noticed topics, and Tradeshift had not made that showing.
Topic 14
Topic 14 concerned “the factual bases for the affirmative defenses in BuyerQuest’s answer in this action.” The court held that this topic failed Rule 30(b)(6)’s reasonable-particularity requirement because it did not identify factual matters and instead sought legal contentions from a lay witness. The court explained that interrogatories and requests for admission may ask for the application of law to facts, but Rule 30 does not authorize that type of request in a deposition in the same way.
The court distinguished improper legal-contention questioning from factual questions a witness might be able to answer, such as asking whether the witness believed it had been tricked into entering a contract and why. But the court found that Tradeshift had asked Mulloy to identify or recite the facts supporting each affirmative defense and to state whether his answer was complete. The court concluded that these questions were improper because they were framed in terms of legal contentions.
Disposition
For these reasons, the court denied Tradeshift’s motion to compel. The opinion does not separately state a disposition on the request for fees and costs beyond denying the motion.
Read the full 4-page opinion on CourtListener, the free public archive maintained by the Free Law Project.