Llewellyn v. Commissioner of Social Security
- Donna Ryu
- 4:17-cv-05571
- U.S. District Court · Northern District of California
- 4
In Llewellyn v. Commissioner, Judge Ryu granted counsel’s motion for $17,614 in Social Security fees and required a $4,000 refund.
Tonia Vel Llewellyn and her attorney Brian Shapiro; the order approved Shapiro’s fee request and required a $4,000 refund to Llewellyn.
What happened
In Llewellyn v. Commissioner of Social Security, the court had previously sent Tonia Vel Llewellyn’s benefits case back for further proceedings, after which an administrative judge found her disabled and awarded past-due benefits. Her attorney, Brian Shapiro, requested $17,614 in fees, equal to 25% of those benefits.
The court found the request reasonable because it stayed within the legal limit, the work performed was reasonable, and nothing showed that Shapiro’s representation was inadequate or that the fee was excessive compared with the benefits obtained. The court also said the separate Equal Access to Justice Act fee had to be refunded to Llewellyn.
Judge Donna M. Ryu granted the motion, awarded $17,614 in attorney fees, and ordered Shapiro to refund Llewellyn the previously awarded $4,000.
The detailed version
- Llewellyn v. Commissioner of Social Security · No. 4:17-cv-05571
- Donna Ryu
- June 14, 2021
Background
Tonia Vel Llewellyn had sought Social Security Disability Insurance benefits. The court previously granted in part her motion for summary judgment and remanded the case for further proceedings. After remand, an Administrative Law Judge found that Llewellyn was disabled and entitled to approximately $70,456 in past-due disability benefits.
Llewellyn’s attorney, Brian Shapiro, moved for attorney fees under 42 U.S.C. § 406(b). The retainer agreement allowed him to request up to 25% of any past-due benefits. He requested $17,614, which was 25% of Llewellyn’s benefit award. The Commissioner did not oppose the request but submitted an analysis of it. Llewellyn had previously received $4,000 in fees under the Equal Access to Justice Act, which Shapiro agreed to refund to her.
Legal standard
Section 406(b) permits an attorney who successfully represents a Social Security claimant in federal court to seek fees of up to 25% of the past-due benefits awarded. The court must independently review a contingency-fee agreement to ensure that it produces a reasonable result. The court considers the quality of the representation and the result achieved, and may reduce the fee for inadequate representation, delay, or an excessive fee. A fee awarded under section 406(b) must be offset by any Equal Access to Justice Act award.
Court’s analysis
Shapiro reported that his office spent 22.4 hours on the case, including 18.1 hours of attorney time and 3.3 hours of paralegal time. The requested fee produced an effective hourly rate of $973.15. The court found the fee reasonable because it did not exceed the 25% statutory maximum, the hours appeared reasonable, and the fee agreement—not a standard hourly-rate calculation—was the proper starting point for review under section 406(b). The court also noted that comparable or higher effective hourly rates had been approved in other California cases.
The court found no indication that Shapiro provided substandard representation. It also considered the substantial past-due benefits awarded to Llewellyn and concluded that the requested fee was not excessively large in relation to those benefits.
Disposition
Judge Donna M. Ryu granted the motion for attorney fees. The court awarded $17,614 and ordered Shapiro to refund Llewellyn the $4,000 previously awarded under the Equal Access to Justice Act.
Read the full 4-page opinion on CourtListener, the free public archive maintained by the Free Law Project.