Lamon v. Foss

Background

Barry Louis Lamon, a state prisoner at Salinas Valley State Prison, filed a civil-rights action under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 against prison staff. After the case was transferred to this court, the court dismissed his original complaint with permission to amend. Lamon filed an amended complaint naming Warden T. Foss, Lt. R. Diaz, Sgt. Covarrubius, Correctional Officers J. Lopez and R. Ramos, and Correctional Officer Kelley.

The amended complaint alleged retaliation for lawsuits and grievances, failure to protect Lamon from threats by other prisoners, violations of California Civil Code sections 52 and 52.1, and intentional infliction of emotional distress. Lamon sought damages and an injunction.

Screening and Claims

Because Lamon sued prison staff, the court conducted an initial screening under 28 U.S.C. § 1915A. The court had to identify claims that were legally sufficient and dismiss claims that were frivolous, failed to state a claim, or sought money from an immune defendant. The court also construed Lamon’s self-represented filing liberally.

First Amendment retaliation

The court found that Lamon’s allegations were sufficient, when liberally construed, to state a First Amendment retaliation claim against Kelly, Ramos, Lopez, Diaz, and Covarrubius. Lamon alleged that prison staff placed him in a flooded cell, gave him meals that made him sick, identified him as a snitch, exposed his property to other prisoners, and disclosed the contents of his grievances in retaliation for his complaints. The court found no specific allegations that Warden Foss participated in the alleged retaliation, so the retaliation claim against Foss was not cognizable.

The court dismissed the retaliation claim to the extent it was based on the Fourteenth Amendment. It explained that the alleged retaliation implicated First Amendment rights, and that Lamon had not alleged a denial of due process or equal protection. To the extent Lamon alleged a due-process violation based on lost or damaged property, the court held that California’s post-deprivation remedies provided an adequate remedy for a random and unauthorized property loss.

Failure to protect

The court found sufficient allegations for an Eighth Amendment failure-to-protect claim. Lamon alleged that Lopez, Kelley, and Ramos identified him to other prisoners as a “snitch” and thereby incited threats or harm. He also alleged that Diaz moved him to another building within the same yard, and that Foss, Diaz, and Covarrubius disregarded his warnings and failed to meaningfully investigate. The court found these allegations sufficient at the screening stage.

The court dismissed the failure-to-protect claim to the extent it was based on the Fourteenth Amendment because Lamon did not allege a violation of due process or equal protection.

State-law claims

The court found that Lamon sufficiently alleged intentional infliction of emotional distress under California law. It also found sufficient allegations for a claim under California’s Bane Act based on interference with Lamon’s First Amendment rights. The court exercised supplemental jurisdiction, meaning it kept those state-law claims in the federal case alongside the federal claims.

The court dismissed the Bane Act claims based on alleged interference with Eighth and Fourteenth Amendment rights for failure to state a claim. The court stated that these dismissed claims, including Lamon’s Fourteenth Amendment claims, were dismissed without leave to amend because the deficiencies remained after the earlier opportunity to amend.

Disposition and Next Steps

The court held that the amended complaint stated cognizable claims for First Amendment retaliation, Eighth Amendment failure to protect, intentional infliction of emotional distress, and Bane Act interference with First Amendment rights. It dismissed the Fourteenth Amendment claims and the Bane Act claims based on the Eighth and Fourteenth Amendments, without leave to amend.

The court ordered service on all six listed defendants. It directed the defendants to file a motion for summary judgment or another dispositive motion concerning the cognizable claims within 91 days after the order was filed. The order also set deadlines for Lamon’s opposition and the defendants’ reply and permitted discovery under the federal rules.