C. G. v. Soledad Unified School District

Background

The court held a pretrial conference and resolved the parties’ motions in limine—motions asking the court to decide before trial what evidence or arguments may be presented to the jury. The court stated that it would issue separate orders concerning proposed jury instructions and other matters discussed at the conference.

Plaintiffs’ Motion in Limine No. 1

The plaintiffs sought to exclude evidence concerning Heather Goodell’s employment as a substitute teacher, including alleged conduct, personality traits, and performance. The motion was granted. The court held that the District had no information that she harmed C.G. or caused C.G.’s injuries, and that the proposed evidence would improperly invite character or propensity reasoning. The court also found the evidence irrelevant and unfairly prejudicial to the plaintiffs. The court rejected the District’s argument that the evidence was relevant to show Heather Goodell’s alleged hypocrisy or the Goodells’ motives for filing the case.

The plaintiffs also sought to exclude evidence concerning contacts with the Monterey County Department of Social Services. The motion was granted. The court held that evidence of one-time reports by Jaime Notheis and Mr. Calderon did not establish a routine practice of reporting student-safety concerns and could improperly suggest that the Goodells had abused C.G. The court excluded evidence of those contacts because it was unfairly prejudicial and likely to confuse or mislead the jury. If the plaintiffs asked whether Notheis or Calderon had reported suspected abuse, however, the court would permit truthful testimony about the reports.

Jaime Notheis’s Motions in Limine

Notheis moved to exclude evidence of alleged conduct involving other students and coworkers. The portion concerning conduct after the period relevant to C.G. was granted, subject to use for impeachment or rebuttal if the District opened the door. The portion concerning conduct before and during the period when C.G. was in Notheis’s classroom was denied, subject to the nature and extent of the specific evidence offered at trial.

The court held that evidence of reports and complaints of similar alleged misconduct made to the District by aides, teachers, or parents could be admitted. The court expressed concern about extended evidence detailing every incident underlying those reports because it could confuse or mislead the jury. The court explained that the evidence could be relevant to whether the District knew or should have known about alleged misconduct and whether the District had a routine practice of tolerating it. The evidence could not be used simply to show that Notheis acted in conformity with the other alleged misconduct.

Notheis also moved to exclude evidence about his current employment status and teaching credential. The motion to exclude evidence about his teaching credential was granted because the plaintiffs stipulated that such evidence should be excluded. As to his employment status, the court stated that it would instruct the jury that Notheis no longer worked for San Vicente Elementary School and that the jury should not draw any inference from that fact. The parties were directed to confer about the wording of that instruction.

The District’s Motions in Limine

The District moved to exclude drafts of Laura Schreibman’s expert report. The court did not decide whether producing the drafts waived work-product protection because the plaintiffs represented that they did not intend to use the drafts for any purpose.

The District moved to prevent the plaintiffs from arguing that internal District policies created the legal standard of care. The motion was denied. The court agreed that the policies did not define the District’s statutory duties, but held that they could be relevant to the plaintiffs’ negligence claims. Failure to follow an internal policy would not establish negligence automatically, but could be evidence that the District breached a duty of care. The court permitted evidence of the policies reflected in the two exhibits identified by the plaintiffs.

The District’s motions concerning Notheis’s prior and subsequent conduct and his treatment of other students were virtually identical to Notheis’s first motion. The court reached the same result: later conduct was excluded subject to impeachment or rebuttal if the District opened the door, while earlier and contemporaneous alleged misconduct could be admitted subject to the specific evidence offered at trial.

The District also sought to bar arguments sometimes called the “Golden Rule” or “reptile theory,” including arguments asking jurors to place themselves in the position of a party. The court expected all counsel to avoid improper closing arguments but did not categorically prohibit the particular trial strategy identified by the District.

Finally, the District challenged damages expert Robert Johnson’s methodology and sought to limit his discussion of legal authority and other experts’ opinions. The court denied the portion concerning Johnson’s use of a negative discount rate because it was an untimely challenge under the rule governing expert evidence. The court would not permit Johnson or another witness to testify about what the law is. Johnson could describe his work and, if necessary, his understanding of requirements for calculating the discount rate, even if that description tracked a legal standard. The court also noted that experts could not testify about matters that had not been properly disclosed before trial. The order states that the court did not resolve whether additional action was needed on that disclosure issue.

Disposition

The order resolved the identified motions in limine but did not decide the parties’ underlying claims or defenses. It was signed by Virginia K. Demarchi, United States Magistrate Judge, and dated June 26, 2021.