Robert M. v. Kijakazi

Background

Robert M. applied for Supplemental Security Income under Title XVI of the Social Security Act, alleging disability beginning June 1, 2016. He identified physical and mental conditions including back and knee problems, arthritis, hypertension, hepatitis C, a prior cerebrovascular accident, seizures, memory loss, depression, anxiety, insomnia, and bipolar disorder.

An administrative law judge found that Robert M. had severe impairments including bipolar disorder, degenerative disc disease, left shoulder arthrosis, hypertension, and bilateral knee pain. The administrative law judge found that he could perform less than the full range of light work and could perform jobs existing in significant numbers in the national economy. The Appeals Council denied review. Robert M. then sought judicial review, and both sides moved for summary judgment, a procedure in which the court decides whether either side is entitled to judgment based on the administrative record and applicable law.

Rulings on the Issues

The court upheld the administrative law judge’s use of Medical-Vocational Rule 202.10. Because Robert M. had additional limitations beyond the full range of light work, the rule did not itself resolve whether he was disabled, so the administrative law judge properly consulted a vocational expert. The court also rejected Robert M.’s reliance on rules governing sedentary or medium work because those rules did not apply to the capacity the administrative law judge found.

The court rejected Robert M.’s challenge to the number of jobs identified. The vocational expert identified assembler, small-parts, and shirt-folder work, totaling 32,000 jobs in the national economy. The court held that Robert M.’s authority concerning a “significant range of work” under Medical-Vocational Rule 202.00(c) did not apply because Robert M. was not an individual of “advanced age.” The court further stated that Robert M. cited no authority showing that two occupations were insufficient under the applicable requirement that work exist in significant numbers in the national economy.

The court held that the administrative law judge erred in rejecting Robert M.’s symptom testimony. After finding that his impairments could reasonably cause the alleged symptoms, the administrative law judge needed specific, clear, and convincing reasons for discounting his testimony. The court found that none of the six reasons given met that standard: the objective medical evidence did not fully support the testimony; treatment was supposedly routine or conservative; one medical note said his pain was controlled; the record did not show that his walker was prescribed and medically necessary; he often appeared not to be in acute distress; and he had worked only sporadically before the alleged onset date.

The court explained that the administrative law judge relied on general medical findings without identifying which testimony they contradicted. It also found that the record did not support the conclusion that treatment was limited, because Robert M. had been referred to specialists and received recommended injections and ablations, and his primary care records documented ongoing mental-health treatment. The court found that relying on one statement that his pain was controlled improperly ignored numerous other records reporting continuing or severe pain. It also found that the walker evidence did not provide a sufficient reason to reject his testimony and that the administrative law judge had selectively cited visits where he appeared comfortable while ignoring visits documenting distress. Finally, the court held that sporadic work history alone was not enough to reject all of his symptom testimony.

The court rejected Robert M.’s argument that the administrative law judge wrongly treated his physician’s assistant as an unacceptable medical source. Robert M.’s application was filed before March 27, 2017, and the regulation applicable to his application did not treat a physician’s assistant as an acceptable medical source. The court also rejected his argument that the administrative law judge needed to make additional specific findings about several basic mental demands of unskilled work. The administrative law judge had followed the required process for evaluating mental impairments and had made the required mental-capacity findings.

Disposition

Because the adverse evaluation of Robert M.’s symptom testimony was unsupported by substantial evidence and could have affected the disability determination, the court found the error was not harmless. The court declined to order payment of benefits because the record was not fully developed and did not show that Robert M. would necessarily be found disabled if his testimony were credited. The vocational expert had not been asked questions incorporating the limitations described in that testimony.

The court GRANTED Robert M.’s motion for summary judgment, DENIED the Commissioner’s cross-motion for summary judgment, and REMANDED for further proceedings consistent with the order.