Doe v. City Of Concord

Background

Jane Doe, who was proceeding without a lawyer, sued the City of Concord, the City of Cotati, the County of Contra Costa, the County of Sonoma, and individuals from the Concord Police Department, Cotati Police Department, Contra Costa County District Attorney’s Office, and Sonoma County District Attorney’s Office. The court had authorized her to proceed using a pseudonym. Her first amended complaint was the operative complaint and alleged nine causes of action. The four federal claims arose under 42 U.S.C. § 1983, with one also arising under 42 U.S.C. § 1985.

Doe alleged that E.W. Weamer raped her around ten times between 2013 and 2014. She said she reported the matter to the Cotati and Concord Police Departments on October 18, 2019, and that law-enforcement personnel discouraged her from seeking prosecution, blamed or disbelieved her, and failed to investigate or pursue the case. She characterized this as discriminatory under-policing and selective under-enforcement against rape victims, principally violating her Fourteenth Amendment right to equal protection.

All defendants moved to dismiss. The court addressed the motions at Docket Nos. 34, 35, 36, and 37.

Standing

The defendants sought dismissal under Rule 12(b)(1), which concerns the court’s subject-matter jurisdiction, arguing that Doe lacked standing to challenge the failure to file criminal charges against Weamer. The court denied that part of the motions. It held that Doe had sufficient standing under Article III of the Constitution to seek to vindicate the constitutional and legal rights alleged in her complaint.

Equal-protection claim

The court dismissed the first cause of action under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 for failure to state a claim under Rule 12(b)(6). A Rule 12(b)(6) dismissal means the complaint does not adequately allege a legally viable claim, assuming its factual allegations are true for purposes of the motion.

The court explained that an equal-protection claim under § 1983 generally requires allegations that defendants acted with an intent or purpose to discriminate against the plaintiff because of membership in a protected class. Doe instead argued that she could proceed as a “class of one,” meaning that officials treated her differently from similarly situated people without a rational basis. The court was not persuaded that this theory should be applied in this context. It also concluded that, even under that theory, Doe had not plausibly alleged that she was treated differently from similarly situated people in an irrational and wholly arbitrary way.

The court pointed to allegations that personnel had expressed concerns that the case was about six years old, that there was no physical evidence or corroboration, and that a jury might believe Doe had consented to sex with Weamer. It concluded that the reasons alleged for declining to prosecute and taking no further action were rational and related to a legitimate governmental purpose.

Other federal and state claims

Because the complaint did not adequately allege a § 1983 claim, the court also dismissed Doe’s § 1985 conspiracy claim and municipal-liability claims, identified as counts two through four. The court stated that a cognizable § 1983 claim was required for the conspiracy claim and that a constitutional violation was required for the municipal-liability claims.

The court declined to exercise supplemental jurisdiction over Doe’s state-law claims, counts five through nine, because it had dismissed the federal claims. Supplemental jurisdiction is the court’s authority to decide related state-law claims in a case that also includes federal claims.

Disposition

The court dismissed the first amended complaint in its entirety with leave to amend. It stated that it could not conclude at that stage that the deficiencies could not be cured by amendment. Doe could file a second amended complaint by August 20, 2021. The order barred adding new claims or defendants without the court’s prior approval and warned that failure to meet the deadline or otherwise comply would result in dismissal under Rule 41(b).

The court also accepted Doe’s oversize combined opposition brief on that occasion but directed that future oversized briefs require advance approval and could be stricken if not approved.