Kennedy v. County of Contra Costa

Background

Johl Jonathan Kennedy, who represented himself, sued Contra Costa County and employees of the Contra Costa County Department of Child Support Services. He alleged that defendants violated his procedural due-process rights under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 and asserted California civil-rights, intentional-infliction-of-emotional-distress, negligent-infliction-of-emotional-distress, and negligence claims. He sought $1 million in damages.

Kennedy had an Arizona divorce decree requiring him to pay child support. After his former wife and their children moved to California, the County’s Department registered the Arizona support order in a California family court. Kennedy said he did not receive the registration order, although defendants mailed it to his Phoenix address and a County employee signed a proof of service. He also alleged that Department employees made false statements about his residence and about whether California or Arizona had authority to modify the support order during proceedings in both states.

The Arizona Court of Appeals later held that California could enforce the Arizona support order because it had been properly registered there, but that Arizona retained continuing, exclusive authority to modify the order because California had not modified it.

Procedural History and Motions

Defendants moved for summary judgment. Summary judgment is a decision without a trial when the evidence shows that no genuine dispute about an important fact requires a trial and the moving party is entitled to judgment under the law. The court viewed the evidence in the light most favorable to Kennedy.

The court had previously denied Kennedy’s request to file a late motion for partial summary judgment because he had not shown good cause to change the scheduling order. In this order, the court excused his late responses to defendants’ requests for admission, considering his unrepresented status, the potentially case-dispositive effect of the admissions, and defendants’ lack of claimed prejudice. The court also granted his unopposed request to file a sur-reply.

Procedural Due-Process Claims

The court explained that a procedural-due-process claim under § 1983 requires a constitutionally protected liberty or property interest, government deprivation of that interest, and a lack of adequate process.

Regarding notice of the registration order, the court held that due process requires reasonable efforts to provide notice, not proof of actual receipt. Defendants mailed the order to Kennedy’s undisputed address at the time, and the mailbox rule created a presumption that he received it. Kennedy’s statement that he did not receive the order did not overcome that presumption because he offered no additional evidence of nonreceipt. The court also noted that Kennedy knew by the July 11, 2016 hearing that the California family court was considering the support matter and had not identified evidence showing that he was denied an opportunity to challenge the later order.

Regarding the registration itself, the court found that Kennedy had not shown that defendants’ filing deprived him of a constitutionally protected liberty or property interest. He did not show that he had successfully challenged the registration in California family court or that the court had set it aside. He also did not establish as a matter of law that the registration violated the federal or state child-support statutes he cited.

Regarding the alleged false statements and interference in the family-court proceedings, the court found that Kennedy had not provided evidence that the identified statements were made, were false, or deprived him of a protected liberty or property interest. The court also stated that defamation by a government actor generally does not create a § 1983 claim. Because Kennedy failed to show an underlying constitutional violation, the court held that he could not establish municipal liability against the County under Monell, the doctrine governing when a local government may be liable under § 1983.

State-Law Claims

Defendants argued that Kennedy’s state-law claims were barred because he had not complied with the California Tort Claims Act. That law generally requires a person seeking damages from a public entity or its employees to present a written claim to the entity within six months after the claim accrues, before filing suit.

Defendants presented evidence that Kennedy had not filed a tort claim with the County concerning his damages claims. Kennedy did not respond to defendants’ motion on this issue. The court therefore held that he had not raised a triable dispute about compliance with the claim-presentation requirements and granted summary judgment to defendants on the state-law claims.

Disposition

The court granted defendants’ motion for summary judgment. The clerk was directed to enter a separate judgment. The order also disposed of Docket Nos. 75, 84, 89, and 91.