Gowan v. Stryker Corporation

Background

Molly Gowan sued Stryker Corporation and Stryker Sales Corporation under California law. Her claims alleged discrimination, harassment, and retaliation based on gender; failure to promote because of sex discrimination; negligent hiring, supervision, and retention; wrongful constructive termination; retaliation under California Labor Code section 1102.5; and intentional infliction of emotional distress.

Gowan filed a discrimination charge with California’s Department of Fair Employment and Housing on March 30, 2018. The court therefore treated conduct occurring on or after March 30, 2017, as potentially timely for her claims. During that period, Gowan worked as a sales representative in Colorado. She complained there about Lindsay Conley’s treatment of her and about her opportunities for advancement. She also complained about Conley while attending a work event in Dallas, Texas.

Gowan later began a human-resources manager position based in San Jose. The court found, based on her deposition testimony, that Gowan and her family temporarily lived in Texas while she tried to find a home in San Jose. During her four months in the position, she complained in San Jose about Conley’s prior conduct, filed a complaint concerning alleged sexist remarks by Conley and Tommy Van Galder, and attended an October 2017 meeting where Brett Ladd made gender-related comments about two female employees. Gowan then resigned, although she continued working for Stryker for about two months and applied for other Stryker positions.

Summary-judgment standard

Summary judgment is appropriate when the evidence shows no genuine dispute about a fact that could affect the result and the moving party is entitled to judgment under the law. The court does not decide witness credibility or weigh competing evidence at this stage. It views the evidence in the light most favorable to the party opposing the motion.

Evidentiary objections

The court overruled Stryker’s objections to third-party declarations because the evidence could potentially be presented in an admissible form at trial. The court sustained Stryker’s objection to Gowan’s statement that she lived with her in-laws in San Jose, finding that statement contradicted her earlier deposition testimony and created a sham factual dispute. The court overruled Stryker’s other objections to Gowan’s declaration.

California employment-law claims

The court held that California’s Fair Employment and Housing Act, or FEHA, does not apply to employment conduct occurring outside California. The court rejected Gowan’s argument that it should consider the total circumstances or that conduct outside California became actionable because it was allegedly ratified in California. The court concluded that FEHA requires actionable conduct in California during the relevant period.

The court identified three relevant California events: Gowan’s August 2017 complaints about Conley’s past conduct; her complaint about alleged sexist comments made during a conference call; and Ladd’s comments at the October 2017 meeting. The court ruled that these events could not support her FEHA claims.

For discrimination, retaliation, and wrongful-termination claims, the court ruled that Gowan had not shown an adverse employment action in California. The court also rejected her constructive-discharge theory. It relied on her statement that she loved Stryker and its business unit, her continued work for Stryker after announcing her resignation, and her continued applications for Stryker positions. The court granted summary judgment for Stryker on the discrimination, retaliation, and wrongful-termination claims.

For harassment, the court ruled that Ladd’s comments about two female employees who were not present were not sufficiently severe or pervasive to create a legally hostile work environment. The court granted summary judgment for Stryker on the harassment claim.

The court rejected Gowan’s continuing-violation argument because it found no FEHA violation during the relevant one-year period. It also ruled that her failure-to-promote claim relied on conduct that either occurred during an earlier job period, lacked evidence that it occurred in California, or occurred outside California. The court granted summary judgment on the failure-to-promote claim.

Because Gowan’s underlying FEHA claims failed, the court ruled that her derivative claim for failure to prevent discrimination, harassment, or retaliation also failed and granted summary judgment for Stryker on that claim.

Other claims

Gowan did not address her wrongful-termination and retaliation claims under California Labor Code section 1102.5 in opposition to the motion. The court treated those claims as abandoned and granted summary judgment for Stryker on them.

The court granted summary judgment on Gowan’s negligent-hiring, supervision, and retention claim because it was based on conduct outside California and the court found no underlying harassment or discrimination under California law.

The court also ruled that Gowan’s intentional-infliction-of-emotional-distress claim was barred by the California Workers’ Compensation Act. It stated that this result would apply even if the alleged conduct had occurred in California because the conduct arose from the employment relationship and did not constitute a FEHA violation. The court granted summary judgment for Stryker on that claim.

Disposition

The court stated that Gowan may have had a claim against Conley under Colorado or federal law, but that she had brought this case under California law based on conduct occurring outside California. The court granted Stryker’s motion for summary judgment and dismissed Gowan’s case.