Robertson v. Doe
- Beth Freeman
- 5:20-cv-02523
- U.S. District Court · Northern District of California
- 9
In Robertson v. J. Kaiser-Nevel, Judge Freeman allowed several claims to proceed, ordered service, and denied Robertson’s reconsideration motion.
Reginald Robertson, the self-represented plaintiff, may proceed with the claims the court found cognizable. D. Bussell, Deputies J. Alvarez, M. Ella, G. Harris, and C. Wong, and Alameda County were directed to participate in service and further proceedings.
What happened
In Reginald Robertson v. J. Kaiser-Nevel, the court reviewed Robertson’s third amended complaint in his civil-rights case concerning conditions at Santa Rita Jail. Robertson, who was representing himself, alleged that jail staff left him trapped in a visiting booth for several hours.
The court found that Robertson adequately alleged a First Amendment retaliation claim and a Fourteenth Amendment claim against D. Bussell. The court also allowed his related state-law claims against Bussell, several deputies, and Alameda County to proceed and ordered that the defendants be served.
Judge Beth Labson Freeman denied Robertson’s request to reconsider the earlier denial of permission for electronic filing. The order directed the defendants to file a motion addressing the claims or explain why such a motion could not resolve the case.
The detailed version
- Robertson v. Doe · No. 5:20-cv-02523
- Beth Freeman
- Sept. 24, 2021
Background
Reginald Robertson, identified as a pretrial detainee, filed this lawsuit without a lawyer under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 against staff at Santa Rita Jail. The court had dismissed an earlier complaint while allowing Robertson to amend it. Robertson then filed a third amended complaint, which became the operative complaint. The order also addressed Robertson’s motion asking the court to reconsider its earlier denial of permission for electronic case filing.
Robertson alleged that, after a verbal dispute with Technician D. Bussell, Bussell announced a non-contact visit and that Robertson was placed in visiting booth number 8. Robertson alleged that the booth door would not open and that he and another inmate repeatedly tried to alert jail staff for several hours by pressing a call button, hitting the doors, and yelling. He alleged that he was without food, water, restroom access, and prescribed medications during that period, and that his existing health conditions were worsened. Deputy J. Alvarez eventually released the inmates and moved them to isolation cells.
Claims the Court Found Cognizable
The court conducted the required screening of a prisoner’s complaint under 28 U.S.C. § 1915A. Screening is an early review used to identify claims that are frivolous, malicious, inadequately pleaded, or barred because they seek money from an immune defendant.
The court found that Robertson adequately stated a First Amendment retaliation claim against Bussell. Robertson alleged that Bussell kept him confined in the booth to retaliate against him for threatening to file an inmate grievance, that the conduct chilled his exercise of First Amendment rights, and that it did not reasonably advance a legitimate correctional goal.
The court also found that Robertson adequately stated a Fourteenth Amendment claim against Bussell based on deliberate indifference. Deliberate indifference means that an official consciously disregarded a substantial risk of harm. The court concluded that Robertson’s allegations that Bussell deliberately kept him trapped in the booth for several hours, viewed liberally, stated such a claim.
Robertson also asserted state-law claims alleging negligence and violations of state regulations. He alleged that Bussell was negligent; that Deputies J. Alvarez, M. Ella, G. Harris, and C. Wong failed to perform required inmate safety checks; and that Alameda County failed to discharge a duty imposed by statute. The court exercised supplemental jurisdiction over those state-law claims.
Reconsideration Motion
The court denied Robertson’s motion for reconsideration of the earlier denial of permission for electronic filing. Robertson argued that a general order had suspended the need for self-represented parties to seek permission to use electronic filing, that a local rule allowed a nonlawyer to file papers for another person, and that he had previously received electronic-filing permission.
The court rejected those arguments. It stated that the general order had been abrogated on June 23, 2021; that the local rule applied only to a party who already had electronic-filing status; and that the earlier case involved a finding that Robertson personally met the technical requirements for electronic filing. In this case, the court found that Robertson had not shown he could file electronically without the assistance of the third party. The motion for reconsideration was therefore DENIED.
Further Proceedings
The court ordered the clerk to send service materials to D. Bussell, Deputies J. Alvarez, M. Ella, G. Harris, and C. Wong, and to send the materials concerning Alameda County to County Counsel. The defendants were directed, no later than 91 days after the order was filed, to file a summary-judgment motion or another dispositive motion addressing the claims found cognizable. The order also set procedures for Robertson’s opposition and the defendants’ reply, allowed discovery under the federal rules, and warned that failure to prosecute could result in dismissal.
This order screened the complaint and permitted the identified claims to proceed; it did not resolve the ultimate merits of those claims.
Read the full 9-page opinion on CourtListener, the free public archive maintained by the Free Law Project.