Yoon S. v. Saul
- 4:19-cv-03711-DMR
- U.S. District Court · Northern District of California
- 17
In Moung Yoon S. v. Kijakazi, the court found errors in the disability decision, partly granted both motions, and ordered further proceedings.
Moung Yoon S.’s application for Social Security Disability Insurance benefits must be reconsidered by the administrative law judge, including the severity of her mental impairments and how those impairments affect her past work.
What happened
In Moung Yoon S. v. Kijakazi, Moung Yoon S. challenged the denial of her Social Security disability benefits. The administrative law judge found that her arthritis was severe but that her depression, anxiety, and post-traumatic stress disorder were not severe, and concluded that she could return to her past work as a data entry clerk.
The court found that the record did not support treating her mental impairments as nonsevere. It also upheld the classification of her past work as data entry clerk, but said the administrative law judge needed to gather more facts about how her impairments affected her ability to perform that work.
The court granted in part and denied in part both sides’ motions for summary judgment and remanded the case for further proceedings. The opinion does not identify the judge by name; the court entered the order on September 30, 2021.
The detailed version
- Yoon S. v. Saul · No. 4:19-cv-03711-DMR
- Sept. 30, 2021
Background
Moung Yoon S. applied for Social Security Disability Insurance benefits, alleging disability beginning January 15, 2015. The application was denied initially and on reconsideration. After a hearing, an administrative law judge (ALJ) found that she had severe arthritis of the joints but that her medically determinable mental impairments—major depressive disorder, generalized anxiety disorder, and post-traumatic stress disorder—were nonsevere. The ALJ found that she could perform sedentary work with certain limits, including using a cane or crutches as needed, and concluded that she could perform her past relevant work as a data entry clerk. The Commissioner adopted that decision, and Moung Yoon S. sought review under 42 U.S.C. § 405(g).
Issues
Moung Yoon S. challenged the ALJ’s findings that her mental impairments were nonsevere, that she could perform her past relevant work, that her testimony was not credible, and that the ALJ properly rejected lay testimony from her daughter. The Commissioner argued that the ALJ’s decision was supported by substantial evidence and contained no legal error.
Mental impairments
The court held that the ALJ’s finding that Moung Yoon S.’s mental impairments were nonsevere was not supported by substantial evidence. The court emphasized that every non-examining, examining, and treating medical professional discussed in the opinion found that her mental disorders likely had more than a minimal effect on her ability to work, while the ALJ was the only person who concluded otherwise.
The record described diagnoses of major depressive disorder, generalized anxiety disorder, panic disorder, and post-traumatic stress disorder; ongoing psychiatric and therapeutic treatment; medication; panic attacks; concentration problems; insomnia; depression; and suicidal thoughts. State-agency doctors found severe mental impairments and moderate limitations in several areas of functioning. A consulting psychologist found, among other limitations, a marked limitation in completing a normal workweek without interruptions caused by psychiatric symptoms. Her treating providers described continuing symptoms despite treatment and opined that her anxiety and post-traumatic stress symptoms interfered with her ability to concentrate and work at a reasonable pace.
Because the ALJ gave virtually no consideration to the mental impairments when determining Moung Yoon S.’s residual functional capacity, the court found the error was not harmless. The court ordered the ALJ on remand to reconsider the step-two severity analysis and make findings consistent with the opinion.
Past relevant work
The court rejected the Commissioner’s argument that Moung Yoon S. had forfeited her challenge to the classification of her past work. The court found that she had described her prior job as an administrative assistant in her work-history report, through counsel before the hearing, and in her hearing testimony. The agency had also classified the job as administrative assistant at earlier stages.
On the merits, however, the court upheld the ALJ’s classification of the past work as data entry clerk. The court compared the duties Moung Yoon S. described—primarily entering data, sitting at a desk, and sometimes answering phones or the door—with the data-entry-clerk description in the Dictionary of Occupational Titles. The court concluded that the record supported the vocational expert’s classification and that the ALJ did not improperly classify the job according to only its least demanding function.
The court nevertheless directed the ALJ to conduct additional factfinding on remand about how Moung Yoon S.’s severe impairments affected her ability to perform the data-entry-clerk work. Her testimony indicated that coworkers and a supervisor took over some duties, including lifting supplies, letting visitors into the premises, and responding to callers, because she could not handle them. The court also directed the ALJ to revisit the step-four analysis and provide specific factual findings about the physical and mental demands of the work and the effect of her impairments on her ability to perform it.
Issues not decided
The court did not decide the challenges to the ALJ’s treatment of Moung Yoon S.’s credibility or the lay testimony from her daughter. It explained that reconsideration of the mental impairments could affect those issues on remand. The court also declined at that time to decide separately whether the ALJ failed to consider the mental impairments in evaluating past relevant work, because that analysis could change after the step-two reconsideration.
Disposition
The court granted in part and denied in part Moung Yoon S.’s motion for summary judgment. It also granted in part and denied in part the Commissioner’s cross-motion for summary judgment. The case was remanded for further proceedings consistent with the opinion.
Read the full 17-page opinion on CourtListener, the free public archive maintained by the Free Law Project.