Cooney v. Dwyer
- Yvonne Rogers
- 4:21-cv-01721
- U.S. District Court · Northern District of California
- 5
In Cooney v. Dwyer, Judge Rogers dismissed Cooney’s claims against Dwyer and Soong with prejudice based on immunity and pleading defects.
The ruling directly affected Deborah Cooney and defendants Molly C. Dwyer and Susan Y. Soong. It dismissed Cooney’s claims against Dwyer and Soong with prejudice and vacated the case-management conference.
What happened
In Cooney v. Dwyer, Deborah Cooney, who represented herself, sued more than 140 defendants and alleged that people had impersonated federal judges, forged signatures, and filed unauthorized orders. This order concerned only her claims against Molly C. Dwyer and Susan Y. Soong.
The court ruled that Dwyer and Soong’s alleged actions—including issuing orders, handling case assignments, and processing filings—were part of the judicial process. The court also found that Cooney had not provided enough facts to make her claims plausible and that federal defendants could not be sued under the state-official civil-rights law she invoked.
Judge Yvonne Rogers granted the motion to dismiss with prejudice and dismissed the claims against Dwyer and Soong with prejudice. The court denied leave to amend because it found amendment would be futile, and it vacated the case-management conference.
The detailed version
- Cooney v. Dwyer · No. 4:21-cv-01721
- Yvonne Rogers
- Oct. 12, 2021
Background
Deborah Cooney, proceeding without a lawyer, filed a First Amended Complaint against more than 140 defendants. The defendants included former governors, businesses, a law firm, public agencies and officials, a city and county, and Molly C. Dwyer and Susan Y. Soong. The order addresses only the claims against Dwyer and Soong.
Cooney alleged that the case involved a fraud on the court, including allegations that people impersonated federal judges, forged judges’ signatures, and filed fraudulent or unauthorized orders. She invoked several legal theories, including 42 U.S.C. §§ 1983 and 1985–86, a federal racketeering statute, a claim based on a Supreme Court decision allowing certain damages claims against federal officials, and the Federal Tort Claims Act. She also alleged that Dwyer improperly dismissed an appeal and that Soong failed to forward documents to the assigned federal judge.
Motion to Dismiss
Dwyer and Soong moved to dismiss under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6), which requires dismissal when a complaint does not state a legally sufficient claim. The court explained that a complaint must contain enough factual allegations to make relief plausible, rather than merely possible. Although courts generally read self-represented litigants’ allegations liberally, they do not have to accept conclusory statements, unreasonable inferences, or unsupported factual deductions as true.
Immunity
The court held that Dwyer and Soong were protected by quasi-judicial immunity. This form of immunity can protect court clerks and other nonjudicial court personnel when they perform tasks closely connected to the judicial process. The court found that Cooney’s allegations concerning Dwyer involved issuing orders and circulating an en banc petition. The allegations concerning Soong involved reassignment of cases, issuing orders, and default procedures. The court concluded that these were tasks within the judicial process and granted the motion to dismiss on immunity grounds.
Insufficient Allegations
The court also concluded that the complaint was inadequately pleaded. It found that Cooney had supplied no factual basis for her allegations that Dwyer and Soong impersonated federal judges, forged signatures, or filed unauthorized orders. The court explained that a request for a notarized verification of receipt did not establish wrongdoing and that the district court uses electronic filing, electronic signatures, and electronic stamps.
The court further found that Cooney’s assertion that the defendants were state actors because of relationships or joint action with state and local employees was conclusory. It stated that federal defendants cannot be held liable under 42 U.S.C. § 1983, a statute that generally provides a cause of action for violations committed by state actors.
Disposition
The court granted the motion to dismiss with prejudice and dismissed the claims against Dwyer and Soong with prejudice. Although leave to amend is generally granted freely to a self-represented plaintiff, the court found that amendment would be futile because of its immunity ruling. The court also vacated the case-management conference until further notice and terminated the motion docketed as Dkt. No. 25.
Read the full 5-page opinion on CourtListener, the free public archive maintained by the Free Law Project.