Cooney v. Dwyer

Background

Deborah Cooney, proceeding without a lawyer, moved for a preliminary injunction to prevent all defendants from allegedly arresting, detaining, imprisoning, or involuntarily hospitalizing her. The court stated that more than thirty motions to dismiss were pending. It found that the preliminary-injunction motion improperly attempted to litigate those motions to dismiss.

The first amended complaint named more than 140 defendants, including businesses, law firms, lawyers, public agencies and officials, unions, cities and counties, landlords, and judicial officers. The court described the allegations as sprawling, confusing, and conclusory. Cooney alleged that the defendants collectively participated in fraud on the courts and conspired to deprive her of liberty, employment, health, housing, mail delivery, legal representation, police protection, transportation, communication, and other goods and services. She also alleged, among other things, false arrest, false imprisonment, malicious prosecution, battery, radiation injury, forcible drugging, harm involving utilities and retailers, denied insurance coverage, employment-related harm, and interference by landlords.

She invoked 42 U.S.C. §§ 1983, 1985, and 1986; 18 U.S.C. § 1964; and several criminal statutes. The opinion says her allegations concerned earlier lawsuits, arrests or prosecutions, confinement conditions, utility services, retail services, insurance, employment, and housing.

Court’s analysis

The court held that the entire amended complaint could be dismissed for violating Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 8(a), which requires a pleading to contain a short and plain statement of the claim. It also ruled that Cooney was precluded from relitigating claims connected to an earlier case. The court stated that claim preclusion bars later litigation of claims that were raised or could have been raised earlier when the required relationship among the claims, judgment, and parties exists.

The court construed Cooney’s fraud-on-the-courts theory as an attempted civil claim under the Racketeer Influenced and Corrupt Organizations Act, or RICO. It held that the complaint did not come close to meeting Rule 9(b)’s requirement that fraud allegations identify the who, what, when, where, and how of the alleged misconduct. The court also found that the complaint did not adequately allege a RICO enterprise because the defendants’ activities were disparate and independent and lacked a common organization or continuing unit.

The court further stated that criminal theories such as obstruction of justice and perjury do not provide a private civil cause of action. It identified additional problems, including absolute judicial immunity for the judicial officers and officials sued, and lack of personal jurisdiction over many defendants. The court concluded that there was no basis for Cooney’s fraud-on-the-courts theory and that amendment would be futile.

Disposition

Judge Yvonne Rogers ordered that Cooney’s first amended complaint be dismissed without leave to amend. The court denied as moot the pending motion for a preliminary injunction, terminated all pending motions, and directed the clerk to close the case.

The court separately granted pro se defendant Dominick Addario, M.D.’s motion to set aside default and dismissed him from the case. It found that Addario’s failure to respond was not culpable because he had been served through a certified public accountant and noted the preference for resolving cases on their merits.