Estate of Donald Nelson v. County of Alameda

Background

Donald Nelson died on June 19, 2020, from injuries suffered after another inmate, Hayward Harrison Blake IV, attacked him at Santa Rita Jail. The complaint alleged that deputies inadequately evaluated Nelson and Blake during intake, placed them together despite their mental-health indicators and Blake’s severe intoxication, failed to monitor them adequately, delayed calling paramedics after the attack, and failed to provide care while waiting for paramedics.

Nelson’s siblings sued Alameda County, Deputy Travis Egan, Lieutenant B.D. Barker, unidentified Alameda County employees, California Forensic Medical Group, and unidentified employees of that group. The County Defendants—Alameda County, Egan, Barker, and Does 1–10—moved to dismiss the First Amended Complaint under Rule 12(b)(6), which permits dismissal when a complaint does not state a legally sufficient claim. The opinion addresses the claims against the County Defendants.

Claims at Issue

The First Amended Complaint asserted:

- Count Two: a claim under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 against Egan and Does 1–10 for failing to provide safe conditions and medical care in violation of the Fourteenth Amendment. - Count Three: a § 1983 claim against Alameda County based on alleged policies, practices, and customs. - Count Four: a § 1983 supervisory-liability claim against Barker. - Count Five: a California negligence claim against the County Defendants. - Count Six: a claim under California Government Code § 845.6 for failing to summon medical care.

Standing and Survival Requirements

The court first addressed whether the plaintiffs could bring the claims as survival actions—claims that belonged to Nelson during his life and passed to his successors. California Code of Civil Procedure § 377.32 required, among other things, an executed affidavit stating that no other person had a superior right to bring or continue the case and attaching a certified copy of Nelson’s death certificate.

The court found that none of the three affidavits submitted by the plaintiffs satisfied those requirements. None was executed by Otha Nelson, none contained the required statement about a superior right, and none attached a certified death certificate. The court therefore dismissed all federal and state claims against the County Defendants on that ground.

Federal Claims

The court separately held that the federal claims lacked sufficient factual support, even assuming the plaintiffs established the required standing.

For Count Two, the court explained that a pretrial detainee may bring a Fourteenth Amendment claim when jail officials make an intentional confinement decision that creates a substantial risk of serious harm, fail to take reasonable measures to address that risk, and thereby cause injury. The court found the allegations insufficient because the complaint did not explain what Nelson’s or Blake’s classification involved, why it was inadequate, what mental illnesses or behavioral-health flags meant, or why those facts should have made a serious risk to Nelson obvious to a reasonable officer. The allegations also did not show that Blake’s intoxication created an obvious risk of violence, or explain how the deputies’ monitoring was inadequate.

The medical-care theory in Count Two also failed because the complaint did not state how long the deputies delayed calling paramedics, when paramedics arrived, or what care the deputies should have provided before their arrival.

For Count Three, the court held that Alameda County could be liable under the municipal-policy doctrine only if a policy, longstanding custom, pattern, or policymaker decision caused the constitutional injury. The complaint identified no specific policy, custom, or practice, no prior specific incidents at Santa Rita Jail, and no pattern of particular misconduct. Although the plaintiffs referred to two government reports, they did not describe the reports’ contents or explain how they related to this case. The court concluded that the claim merely recited legal elements and therefore failed to state a claim.

For Count Four, the court found that the allegations against Barker lacked detail showing that he personally participated in a constitutional violation or had a sufficient connection to a subordinate’s constitutional violation. Because the complaint also failed to allege that a subordinate committed a constitutional violation, the supervisory-liability claim failed. The court noted that it was unclear whether the complaint also asserted a separate failure-to-train claim.

State-Law Claims and Immunities

The court held that several California statutory immunities limited the state-law claims. California Government Code § 820.8 barred claims against public employees to the extent they were based on supervisory or vicarious liability. Section 844.6 barred the negligence claim against Alameda County because it sought to hold a public entity liable for an injury to a prisoner, but it did not bar negligence claims against public employees or claims under § 845.6. Section 855.8 barred theories based on failing to diagnose Nelson’s or Blake’s mental illness, while other theories—including inadequate treatment, failing to house intoxicated inmates separately, and inadequate monitoring—were not barred at the pleading stage. The court also found that Sections 855.6 and 856 did not provide grounds for dismissal at that stage.

The remaining negligence theories in Count Five failed because the complaint did not adequately allege how the deputies failed to respond to Nelson’s medical needs, why placing Blake with Nelson breached a duty, how monitoring was inadequate, or what training or supervision was deficient.

Count Six also failed. To the extent it relied on a failure-to-diagnose theory, § 855.8 barred it. To the extent it relied on delayed or inadequate medical care after the attack, the allegations that Egan and Barker delayed calling paramedics and provided no care were too conclusory.

Disposition

Judge Charles R. Breyer granted the County Defendants’ motion to dismiss as follows:

- All claims against Barker were dismissed without prejudice for failure to provide a summons. - All claims against the County Defendants were dismissed without prejudice for failure to comply with California Code of Civil Procedure § 377.32. The plaintiffs were granted leave to file amended affidavits that complied with that statute. - Counts Two, Three, and Four were dismissed without prejudice for failure to state a claim. - Count Five was dismissed with prejudice against Alameda County under § 844.6. The portions of Count Five based on failure to diagnose or treat mental illness were dismissed with prejudice against Egan and Barker under § 855.8. Count Five’s other theories were dismissed without prejudice for failure to state a claim. - Count Six was dismissed with prejudice to the extent it relied on failure to diagnose or treat mental illness. Otherwise, Count Six was dismissed without prejudice for failure to state a claim.

The plaintiffs were permitted to file an amended complaint by November 17, 2021.