Sepulveda v. Lakeshore 76, Inc.

Background

Richard Sepulveda sued Lakeshore 76, Inc., Sam Ng, and Wendy Ng. He alleged violations of Title III of the Americans with Disabilities Act (ADA), the California Unruh Civil Rights Act, the California Disabled Persons Act, and California Health and Safety Code provisions. He sought injunctive and declaratory relief under the ADA and statutory damages under the Unruh Act and Disabled Persons Act.

Sepulveda said he visited the Lakeshore gas station and convenience store on four dates in 2020. He claimed that the designated accessible parking space lacked proper dimensions, an access aisle, boundary markings, signage, and warnings, and that the space was not sufficiently level. He also said Lakeshore regularly used cones to block the accessible space and access aisle. As a second barrier, he identified the lack of accessibility signage on the primary entrance door and said he initially had difficulty finding and using an accessible entrance.

An engineer’s report identified additional alleged accessibility problems involving the sidewalk, parking area, retail counter, restroom, and floor mats. Sepulveda relied on those alleged problems in his summary-judgment motion even though his complaint and proposed amended complaint had referred only to the parking-space and signage issues.

Summary-judgment standard

Summary judgment is appropriate when there is no genuine dispute about a material fact and the moving party is entitled to judgment under the law. The court must view the evidence favorably to the party opposing the motion and may not weigh evidence or decide witness credibility.

ADA claim

The court explained that ADA Title III bars disability discrimination in the full and equal enjoyment of a public accommodation. Sepulveda’s disability and Lakeshore’s status as a public accommodation were undisputed. The dispute concerned whether Lakeshore violated applicable accessibility standards.

For an existing, unaltered facility, the ADA generally requires removal of architectural barriers when removal is readily achievable—meaning easily accomplishable without much difficulty or expense. The plaintiff initially must plausibly show that the cost of removing the barrier does not exceed the benefits under the circumstances. The defendant then bears the ultimate burden of showing that removal is not readily achievable.

The court concluded that Sepulveda had not shown that the 2010 accessibility standards applied. Lakeshore submitted evidence that Sam Ng had not altered the property since acquiring it in 2005, and Sepulveda offered no contrary evidence. The court therefore treated the 2010 standards as inapplicable and considered whether the alleged barriers violated the 1991 standards and, if so, whether changes to comply with the later standards were readily achievable.

Parking space

The parties did not dispute that the parking-space cross slope exceeded the two-percent limit in the 1991 standards. But the court denied summary judgment because Sepulveda did not meet his initial burden concerning whether correcting the slope was readily achievable. His own engineering evidence described the site as difficult to make compliant and suggested that correcting the parking area could require capital improvements and interfere with circulation. The court also declined to address the cone-related allegation because Sepulveda did not explain the legal basis for that claim.

Entrance signage

The court also denied summary judgment on the alleged entrance-signage barrier. Sepulveda did not establish that the cited 1991 signage provisions applied or that Lakeshore violated them. The record indicated that the property had one front door and that the entrance was accessible. The court explained that the relevant signage provision applies when a facility has multiple entrances and not all are accessible, but Sepulveda had not shown that those circumstances existed.

Additional barriers

The court would not consider the alleged problems involving the counter, restroom, floor mats, shelving, or indoor turning radius. Sepulveda had not identified those barriers in his complaint or proposed amended complaint, so defendants had not received fair notice that they formed the basis of the ADA claim. The court held that an expert report produced during the case generally cannot substitute for identifying the barriers in a properly pleaded complaint.

California claims and disposition

The court denied summary judgment on the California claims to the extent they depended on ADA violations because Sepulveda had not succeeded on his ADA claims. His remaining state-law theories depended on alleged violations of the California Health and Safety Code or California Building Code. But he supplied no evidence showing when the property was constructed or altered, so the court could not determine which state accessibility requirements applied.

For these reasons, Judge Donna M. Ryu denied Sepulveda’s motion for summary judgment. The court noted that he had filed the motion before discovery closed and set a case-management conference for January 19, 2022.