Hayer v. Liverant
- Donna Ryu
- 4:22-cv-05420
- U.S. District Court · Northern District of California
- 4
In Hayer v. Liverant, Judge Chhabria denied both parties’ summary-judgment motions, leaving the disability, retaliation, and related claims unresolved.
Hayer and Liverant; both parties must continue litigating the claims because the court denied both summary-judgment motions.
What happened
In Hayer v. Liverant, Hayer sought partial judgment on her Fair Housing Act claims alleging failure to accommodate, retaliation, and unequal treatment. Liverant sought judgment on all of Hayer’s claims.
The court denied both motions. It concluded that a jury could find Liverant acted in bad faith by responding hostilely to Hayer’s request to keep an emotional support animal, but could also find that his requests for more information showed good faith. The court also found disputed facts about the reasons for the warning notice and different treatment of tenants, and denied judgment on the emotional-distress and negligence claims because Liverant provided no separate supporting argument.
Judge Vince Chhabria issued the order on November 30, 2023. The ruling leaves the claims for further proceedings rather than deciding them through summary judgment.
The detailed version
- Hayer v. Liverant · No. 4:22-cv-05420
- Donna Ryu
- Nov. 30, 2023
Background
Hayer moved for partial summary judgment, a procedure asking the court to decide claims without a trial when there is no genuine dispute about important facts. She sought judgment on her Fair Housing Act claims for failure to accommodate, retaliation, and disparate treatment. Liverant moved for summary judgment on all of Hayer’s claims. The court denied both motions.
Failure to Accommodate
The court applied the Fair Housing Act’s reasonable-accommodation requirements. A plaintiff must show that she has a disability covered by the Act, that the defendant knew or reasonably should have known about it, that the accommodation may be necessary to provide an equal opportunity to use and enjoy the dwelling, that the accommodation is reasonable, and that the defendant refused it. The court also explained that when a disability is not obvious, a landlord may request information confirming the disability or the need for a specific accommodation, but must engage in a good-faith interactive process before refusing the request.
Hayer requested permission to keep an emotional support animal and provided documentation from her treating psychologist. The court concluded that the request was vague enough to justify additional inquiry. But it also found that Liverant’s response—a letter from his lawyer to Hayer’s psychologist—was hostile and could lead a reasonable jury to view it as a bad-faith refusal. The letter questioned the therapeutic value of emotional support animals and requested citations to six peer-reviewed research articles supporting the animal and its use for Hayer’s specific limitations.
The court nevertheless denied Hayer’s motion on this claim. Although Liverant’s response appeared not to have been made in good faith, it did request some information, including Hayer’s specific functional limitations and the species of animal involved. The court therefore concluded that a reasonable juror could, however unlikely, find that Liverant acted in good faith.
Retaliation and Disparate Treatment
Hayer argued that a 10-day warning notice was an adverse action taken in response to her accommodation request. She also argued that Liverant’s treatment of nondisabled tenants who wanted pets showed disparate treatment. The court found that Hayer had established an initial case for both claims. But Liverant offered nondiscriminatory explanations: Hayer allegedly violated the lease’s no-pets provision, and differences in treatment could be explained by the type of animal the tenants sought to keep.
Because the parties’ evidence left factual disputes about Liverant’s motivations, the court denied Hayer’s motion for summary judgment on the retaliation and disparate-treatment claims.
Emotional-Distress and Negligence Claims
Liverant also sought summary judgment on Hayer’s intentional-infliction-of-emotional-distress and negligence claims. The court denied his motion as to those claims because he provided no separate argument or specific supporting evidence.
Disposition
The court denied both Hayer’s motion for partial summary judgment and Liverant’s motion for summary judgment. The order did not resolve the claims in either party’s favor through summary judgment.
Read the full 4-page opinion on CourtListener, the free public archive maintained by the Free Law Project.