Johnson v. Tram Chim's Corp
- William Orrick
- 3:21-cv-01821
- U.S. District Court · Northern District of California
- 3
In Johnson v. Tram Chim's Corp, Judge Orrick denied Scott Johnson’s default-judgment application without prejudice, citing missing evidence and legal analysis.
Scott Johnson must provide the additional declarations and, if necessary, briefing required by the order before seeking default judgment again. Tram Chim's Corp’s default-judgment application remains unresolved; the defendant did not oppose or appear.
What happened
In Johnson v. Tram Chim's Corp, Scott Johnson asked the court to enter a default judgment against Tram Chim's Corp. The defendant did not oppose the request or appear, and the court canceled the hearing.
The court found that the request did not adequately address whether proposed changes to remove barriers were readily achievable under the Americans with Disabilities Act. Johnson’s filings also did not clarify whether indoor dining was available, whether accessible indoor dining surfaces existed, or whether the law required accessible outdoor dining when indoor dining was available. The court also found missing support for requested investigation costs and attorney fees.
Judge William Orrick denied the application without prejudice. He required additional declarations, and possibly briefing, about the dining surfaces, investigation costs, and review of the complaint by attorney Amanda Seabock, all within ten days.
The detailed version
- Johnson v. Tram Chim's Corp · No. 3:21-cv-01821
- William Orrick
- Nov. 8, 2021
Background
Scott Johnson filed an application for entry of default judgment against Tram Chim's Corp. A default judgment is a judgment requested against a party that has not appeared or defended the case. The defendant and defense counsel did not file an opposition or appear. The court found the matter suitable for decision without oral argument and vacated the November 10, 2021 hearing.
Court’s Analysis
The court focused on Johnson’s claim under the Americans with Disabilities Act that a public accommodation must remove architectural barriers when removal is readily achievable. Johnson’s motion argued that whether removal was readily achievable was an affirmative defense that would be waived if the defendant did not raise it. The court stated that this argument was no longer supported by controlling Ninth Circuit law. Under the burden-shifting standard the court cited, even in a default-judgment case, the plaintiff must initially show plausibly that a proposal for removing a barrier is readily achievable.
The complaint alleged that no wheelchair-accessible dining surfaces were available, but it did not state whether Johnson sought indoor or outdoor dining. The motion and Johnson’s declaration instead referred to a lack of accessible outdoor dining surfaces. The filings did not address whether indoor dining was available during Johnson’s November 2020 visit, whether accessible indoor dining surfaces were available, or whether the Americans with Disabilities Act required accessible outdoor dining if accessible indoor dining was otherwise offered. The court found these evidentiary and legal gaps prevented it from granting the application.
The court also found that Johnson had not supported his request for $400 in investigation costs. The filing did not include an investigator’s declaration substantiating the investigation or its cost. It included an unsigned report and photographs, but no declaration from an investigator or attorney identifying, authenticating, or explaining those materials.
Finally, the court noted that Amanda Seabock signed the complaint, but the fee materials did not request compensation for her review of the complaint or other work on the case. Before awarding attorney fees, the court required Seabock to submit a declaration stating that she reviewed the complaint in its filed form before it was filed.
Disposition
Judge William H. Orrick denied the application for entry of default judgment without prejudice. The court required Johnson to provide a supplemental declaration about the availability and accessibility of indoor dining. If indoor dining was available but Johnson did not know whether accessible surfaces existed, he also had to submit a memorandum addressing whether accessible outdoor dining was required. If indoor dining was not offered during his visit, no further briefing on that issue was required. A declaration substantiating the investigation and its cost was also required, as was Seabock’s declaration about reviewing the complaint. The required declarations and any necessary briefing were due within ten days of the order.
Read the full 3-page opinion on CourtListener, the free public archive maintained by the Free Law Project.