Horton v. Cauley

Background

Cory A. Horton brought 17 claims against the City and County of San Francisco and the San Francisco Public Utilities Commission, which the opinion collectively calls the City or defendants. Horton alleged that, after three men assaulted him with a knife near his job site, the City discriminated against him because of disability and race, failed to accommodate his disability, and retaliated against him by medically separating him from employment.

Horton alleged that he requested changes to his schedule and help with workplace safety after the assault. He later requested remote work, a change in duties, safer building access, or a job transfer. He alleged that these requests were denied and that the City treated leave as his only option. After he remained on medical leave, the City informed him of its intent to medically separate him and medically separated him in November 2021.

The City moved under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6), which requires dismissal when a complaint does not plausibly allege a claim for relief. The motion challenged 10 of Horton’s 17 remaining claims.

Claims Allowed to Continue

The court denied the motion as to Claims 2, 6, 13, and 15, which alleged retaliation under Title VII, the California Fair Employment and Housing Act, the Americans with Disabilities Act, and California Labor Code section 1102.5. Horton alleged that he began an Equal Employment Opportunity Commission and California Department of Fair Employment and Housing complaint process in October 2021, that the City knew about those complaints, and that it later medically separated him. Although the City presented documents dated February 2022, the court found that the pleadings and an October 25, 2021 email allowed a plausible inference that Horton had begun the process earlier. The court held that discovery could clarify when the City learned of the complaints and whether they caused the separation.

The court also denied the motion as to Claim 17 under California Labor Code section 6311, which prohibits retaliation against a person for refusing to work in violation of health and safety standards. At the pleading stage, the court found it plausible that Horton refused to return to work because he feared returning to an unsafe and traumatic workplace. Whether that refusal contributed to the City’s decision to medically separate him would be decided on a more complete factual record.

The court denied the motion as to Claim 9, Horton’s claim concerning a required pre-termination hearing known as a “Skelly” hearing. A Skelly hearing provides certain safeguards before a public employee is deprived of an employment property interest, including notice, the reasons for the proposed action, supporting materials, and an opportunity to respond. The court rejected Horton’s argument that he did not know his meeting qualified as such a hearing, but found that his allegation that Dena Narbaitz was not a neutral reviewer plausibly supported the claim at this stage. The court noted that later discovery could show that Narbaitz was neutral.

Claims Dismissed

The court granted the motion as to Claims 7 and 8, based on California Labor Code sections 230(c) and 230.1. Those provisions protect certain crime victims who take time off for specified purposes, including seeking medical attention, but section 230.1(f) limits the leave protection to the unpaid leave permitted under the federal Family and Medical Leave Act. Horton alleged that he took approximately 39 weeks of leave, while the Family and Medical Leave Act allows a maximum of 12 workweeks in a 12-month period. Because Horton did not allege an adverse employment action during a protected 12-week period, the court held that these claims failed as a matter of law. The motion to dismiss Claims 7 and 8 was granted without leave to amend, and the claims were dismissed with prejudice.

The court granted the motion as to Claim 10 under California Labor Code section 230(e), which prohibits retaliation because of an employee’s status as a crime victim when the employer has notice or actual knowledge of that status. Horton alleged that the City medically separated him because it knew he was a crime victim. The court found the claim implausible because the City allegedly learned of his victim status in August 2020 but did not medically separate him until November 2021, and Horton had not supplied additional facts showing that his victim status caused the separation. The motion to dismiss Claim 10 was granted without leave to amend, and the claim was dismissed with prejudice.

The court granted the motion as to Claim 16 under California Labor Code section 6310, which prohibits retaliation for filing workplace safety or health complaints. Horton alleged that he complained about workplace conditions in August 2020 and was medically separated in November 2021. The court found that the timing was too remote and that the claim lacked other supporting facts connecting his complaints to the separation. The motion to dismiss Claim 16 was granted without leave to amend, and the claim was dismissed with prejudice.

Disposition

Judge William H. Orrick concluded that the motion to dismiss Claims 7, 8, 10, and 16 was granted and those claims were dismissed with prejudice. The motion was denied as to all other claims addressed in the order. The order therefore granted in part and denied in part the City’s motion to dismiss; it did not resolve the surviving claims on their merits.