Brown v. Miller

Background

Alice Brown sued Crescent City and several employees after Officer Ethan Miller stopped her while she was driving in Crescent City at about 3:27 a.m. on January 1, 2018. The stop lasted between approximately seven and nineteen minutes, according to the evidence described in the opinion. Brown was not cited for a traffic violation.

Brown asserted claims involving an allegedly unlawful seizure and detention under the Fourth Amendment, denial of the right to travel without due process under the Fifth Amendment, denial of life, liberty, and the pursuit of happiness without due process under the Fourteenth Amendment, municipal liability under Monell, and defamation. In September 2021, she stipulated to dismissal of the defamation claim. Brown filed the complaint while representing herself; counsel later appeared for her in August 2020.

The pending motion was filed by the defendants remaining in the case: Crescent City, Eric Wier, the City Manager; the Crescent City Police Department; Ethan Miller, the officer who stopped Brown; and Ivan Minsal, the Chief of Police. The motion challenged Brown’s racial-profiling claim and her Monell and supervisory-liability claims. The defendants did not challenge, at this stage, Brown’s claim that Miller stopped her without probable cause or reasonable suspicion.

Racial-profiling claim

Brown, who is Black, contended that Miller stopped her because of her race. She relied on her belief that police knew her car and race from earlier encounters, Miller’s possible ability to see her before the stop, the fact that he recorded her race in the police report, an alleged police log, and alleged social-media activity. Miller testified that he stopped Brown because she was unable to maintain her lane and her speed fluctuated. He also declared that he did not know the driver’s race or gender before the stop and was unfamiliar with Brown’s specific car.

The court applied the summary-judgment standard. Summary judgment is appropriate when the evidence shows no genuine dispute over a material fact and the moving party is entitled to judgment as a matter of law. The court must view the evidence favorably to the party opposing the motion, but that party must offer enough evidence for a reasonable jury to find in her favor.

The court compared Brown’s evidence with the Ninth Circuit’s decision in Bingham v. City of Manhattan Beach. The court explained that, under that precedent, the absence of a valid traffic reason and the difference in race between the officer and the person stopped do not, by themselves, establish discriminatory intent. A plaintiff must present evidence that would allow a reasonable jury to find that the stop was racially motivated.

The court held that Brown had not done so. Even assuming for purposes of the motion that Miller knew Brown’s race and that there was no valid basis for the stop, the court found that Brown’s evidence did not provide the additional support needed to show discriminatory intent. The three or four earlier stops she described lacked information showing that they were racially motivated, and there was no indication Miller was involved in those incidents. The court also found that identifying Brown’s race in the police report, along with other physical characteristics, did not show discriminatory intent. The alleged police log did not provide information about the race of people who were stopped, and the cited deposition testimony did not support Brown’s claim about Miller’s social-media activity.

The court therefore held that there was no genuine dispute that the evidence was insufficient to support a racial-profiling claim and granted the City defendants summary judgment on that claim.

Monell and supervisory claims

The court stated that a Monell claim against the City or the Police Department would require evidence of an official policy, longstanding practice, or custom that caused the constitutional violation. Brown could alternatively prevail by showing that a final policymaker committed or ratified the unconstitutional conduct. The court stated that Monell liability does not apply to individual defendants.

Brown argued that the City had a longstanding practice of stopping her and other people based on race and without probable cause. The court found that her evidence concerning three or four earlier stops did not describe their circumstances and did not show that they resulted from racial profiling. The court granted summary judgment to Crescent City and the Police Department on the Monell claim.

As to supervisory liability, the court stated that a supervisor cannot be held responsible merely for a subordinate’s conduct. The supervisor must have been personally involved, or there must be a sufficient causal connection between the supervisor’s own wrongful conduct and the constitutional violation. The court found that Brown identified no specific action or inaction by Wier or Minsal and granted summary judgment to both on the supervisory claims. The court also stated that Miller was not a supervisor, so a supervisory claim could not proceed against him.

Disposition

Judge Edward M. Chen granted the defendants’ motion for summary judgment in its entirety. The order left only claims against Officer Miller, and specifically did not leave a racial-profiling claim. The remaining claims included Brown’s claim concerning an allegedly illegal traffic stop, which the defendants had not challenged in this motion. The order disposed of Docket No. 103.