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N.D. Cal.Procedural orderFiled Nov. 12, 2021

Sepaniak King v. Facebook, Inc.

Judge
Edward Chen
Docket
3:21-cv-04573
Court
U.S. District Court · Northern District of California
Pages
24
Civil ProcedureMotion to DismissContract
In one sentence

In Sepaniak King v. Facebook, Inc., Judge Chen granted Facebook’s dismissal motion, dismissing nearly all claims with prejudice but allowing one contract theory to be amended.

Who this affects

Adrienne Sepaniak King’s claims were mostly ended, while her implied-covenant claim based on Facebook’s failure to explain the account disabling could be amended. Christopher Edward Sepaniak King’s claims were dismissed with prejudice. Facebook prevailed on the motion to dismiss.

What happened

Adrienne Sepaniak King and Christopher Edward Sepaniak King sued Facebook after Facebook disabled Adrienne King’s account and did not explain which Community Standards it supposedly violated. They claimed breach of contract, emotional distress, conversion, and other violations.

The court rejected the claim under the Communications Decency Act because that law does not create a private claim, and it rejected the emotional-distress, negligence, conversion, and other theories. The court found that Facebook’s account-disabling decision was protected by the law, but said a claim could proceed in amended form based on Facebook’s failure to provide a more specific explanation.

Judge Chen granted Facebook’s motion to dismiss in its entirety. All claims were dismissed with prejudice except the explanation-based implied-contract claim, which was dismissed without prejudice because the Kings had not adequately alleged damages; Adrienne King was allowed to amend that claim.

The detailed version

For law students, journalists, and other readers who want the full reasoning

Case
Sepaniak King v. Facebook, Inc. · No. 3:21-cv-04573
Judge
Edward Chen
Date
Nov. 12, 2021

Background

Adrienne Sepaniak King had a Facebook account for about ten years. She alleged that Facebook disabled it on November 17, 2020, said that the account did not comply with Facebook’s Community Standards, and did not identify the specific violation. Adrienne King and her son, Christopher Edward Sepaniak King, alleged that Facebook did not respond adequately to their later inquiries and that content associated with the account was no longer available.

The first amended complaint asserted eight causes of action: breach of contract; a claim under section 230(c)(2)(A) of the Communications Decency Act; intentional or reckless infliction of emotional distress; negligent or grossly negligent infliction of emotional distress; emotional-distress and loss-of-consortium claims by Christopher King; declaratory and injunctive relief; breach of the implied covenant of good faith and fair dealing; and conversion. Facebook moved to dismiss under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6), which tests whether a complaint alleges enough facts to state a legally plausible claim.

Court’s analysis

The court dismissed the Communications Decency Act claim because the statute does not provide a private right of action. The court stated that section 230(c)(2) provides protection from liability rather than an affirmative claim for damages, and dismissed this claim with prejudice because amendment would be futile.

The court dismissed the declaratory and injunctive-relief cause of action with prejudice because the Kings did not dispute Facebook’s argument that declaratory and injunctive relief are remedies rather than an independent cause of action.

The court dismissed the intentional-infliction-of-emotional-distress claims with prejudice. It held that the alleged conduct—disabling Adrienne King’s account, failing to engage properly with the Kings about the issue, and allegedly destroying account content—was not extreme and outrageous as a matter of law. It also noted that the complaint did not show that Facebook publicly disclosed why the account had been disabled. The court dismissed the negligence-based emotional-distress claims because the Kings had not adequately alleged that Facebook owed them a legal duty independent of their contract. That dismissal was with prejudice because amendment would be futile.

Regarding the contract and implied-covenant claims, the court rejected the theory that Facebook breached its agreement by destroying account content. The Terms of Service did not require Facebook to retain the content, and recognizing that users owned intellectual-property rights in their content did not create an obligation to preserve it. The court dismissed that theory with prejudice.

The court found potentially viable theories based on Facebook’s disabling of Adrienne King’s account and its failure to provide a more specific explanation. The Terms of Service stated that Facebook could suspend or permanently disable an account if it determined that the user had clearly, seriously, or repeatedly breached its Terms or Policies, including the Community Standards. The court concluded at that stage that this language did not clearly give Facebook completely unrestricted discretion. The court also found it plausible that the implied covenant of good faith and fair dealing required Facebook to provide enough information about the account’s suspension to allow a meaningful review request.

The court nevertheless concluded that the Kings had not alleged legally recoverable damages for these contract theories. It rejected mental suffering and reputational injury as contract damages on the allegations presented, and found that the alleged sentimental value of photographs and other content did not establish the required economic value. The court also noted that Adrienne King did not adequately respond to Facebook’s arguments against specific performance, although it later allowed her to amend regarding damages and specific performance.

Communications Decency Act immunity

The court held that section 230(c)(1) of the Communications Decency Act immunized Facebook from the contract and implied-covenant claim to the extent it was based on disabling Adrienne King’s account. Section 230(c)(1) protects an interactive computer service from being treated as the publisher or speaker of information provided by another information-content provider. Relying on binding Ninth Circuit precedent, the court held that this protection covers decisions to remove content as well as decisions to publish it.

The court rejected the Kings’ argument that Facebook had waived this immunity by describing account-disabling standards in its Terms of Service. It distinguished a specific promise to remove particular content from Facebook’s general statement that it would exercise publishing discretion under stated standards. The court held that immunity applied to the account-disabling theory and denied leave to amend that theory because amendment would be futile.

The court reached a different conclusion for the explanation theory. It held that the alleged implied promise to explain why the account was disabled did not depend on Facebook’s status as a publisher making an editorial decision. Section 230 immunity therefore did not apply to that theory.

Disposition

The court granted Facebook’s motion to dismiss in its entirety. All claims were dismissed with prejudice except Adrienne King’s implied-covenant claim based on Facebook’s failure to provide an explanation for disabling her account. That claim was dismissed without prejudice because the complaint did not adequately allege cognizable damages, and the court granted leave to amend regarding damages and specific performance, provided the amendment could be made in good faith.

The court also stated that, after dismissing the federal claim, federal-question jurisdiction was no longer present. It did not make a definitive ruling on whether diversity jurisdiction existed, noting that the record was not sufficiently developed to determine whether the amount-in-controversy requirement was satisfied. Adrienne King was ordered to file an amended complaint by December 10, 2021, Facebook was ordered to respond by January 7, 2022, and the stay of discovery continued while the pleadings were being resolved.

The authoritative version

Read the full 24-page opinion on CourtListener, the free public archive maintained by the Free Law Project.

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