Lyons v. Carmel Unified School District

Background

Michele Lyons sued Carmel Unified School District, Superintendent Ted Knight in his official capacity, and Principal Jay Marden in his official capacity. She brought the action for herself and her minor children, C.L., M.L., S.L., and R.L. The complaint asserted claims under the First Amendment’s Establishment Clause, freedom of speech, Free Exercise Clause, and retaliation protections, as well as the Fourteenth Amendment’s Equal Protection Clause. The plaintiffs sought only declaratory and injunctive relief.

Lyons alleged that the school’s faculty favored Christianity by discussing or celebrating Christian holidays without similar treatment of Hanukkah and Passover. She also alleged that school personnel described Hanukkah as an Israeli holiday while describing Christmas as an American holiday, which she understood as suggesting that Jewish students were less American.

The school’s Parent Teacher Association planned a December 10, 2021, tree-lighting event on school grounds. The event involved decorating an existing tree, with participants asked to bring items that fit inside a paper lunch bag. Lyons sought permission to display a six-foot inflatable menorah. After school officials rejected that request, Lyons filed suit and sought a temporary restraining order allowing the display at the event.

The court held a hearing on December 9, 2021, and denied the application on the record. The written order explains that decision.

Legal standard and character of the requested relief

A temporary restraining order uses the same standard as a preliminary injunction. A plaintiff generally must show a likely success on the merits, likely irreparable harm without relief, that the balance of equities favors the plaintiff, and that an injunction serves the public interest. The court explained that Lyons’s requested order was a mandatory injunction because it would require defendants to change the planned event by allowing a different form of participation—a six-foot inflatable menorah—rather than merely preserving the existing situation. A mandatory injunction requires the law and facts to clearly favor the plaintiff.

The court found that the defendants were involved in the decision to exclude the proposed menorah display. It also ruled that, because the defendants were the school district and officials sued in their official capacities, the claims were governed by the rule that a local government can be liable under federal civil-rights law only when a constitutional violation results from an official policy or custom. The court treated all five claims as brought under that rule.

Claims

Establishment Clause

The plaintiffs argued that the tree-lighting event advanced Christianity by allowing a tree and Christian holiday symbols while excluding a menorah. The court concluded that they had not shown that the law and facts clearly favored their position. Relying on Supreme Court precedent stating that a Christmas tree is not itself a religious symbol, the court rejected the plaintiffs’ showing for purposes of the requested emergency order.

Free speech

The plaintiffs claimed that denying Lyons permission to bring the menorah violated her freedom of speech. The court assumed, without deciding, that the tree site was a limited public forum, meaning a government-created setting open for only certain forms of expression. Even under that assumption, the court found that the plaintiffs had not shown that the exclusion was viewpoint discrimination or unreasonable in light of the event’s purpose. The court also distinguished precedent involving a school district that barred religious use of facilities, noting that the precedent did not establish a right to participate in another group’s already scheduled event in a different manner.

Free exercise of religion

The plaintiffs argued that excluding the menorah substantially burdened their ability to practice their religion. The court concluded that they had not shown that the law and facts clearly favored them on this claim.

Equal protection

The complaint included an Equal Protection Clause claim, but the temporary-restraining-order application did not address it. The court nevertheless concluded that the plaintiffs had not satisfied the required showing on any claim.

Retaliation

The plaintiffs alleged that defendants retaliated against Lyons for exercising First Amendment rights, including requesting permission to display the menorah. They identified the denial of the request, instructions to families to disregard Lyons’s flyer, and alleged threats of discipline as retaliatory conduct. The court found that the evidence also supported an alternative explanation: that defendants were enforcing what they viewed as reasonable limits on the tree-lighting event. In addition, the plaintiffs had not identified the required district policy, custom, or practice with enough specificity to support this claim under the rule governing local-government liability.

Disposition and scope

The court DENIED the plaintiffs’ application for a temporary restraining order. It stated that the ruling only determined that the plaintiffs had not met the required burden at that stage. The denial was without prejudice to an application for a preliminary injunction or another appropriate motion based on a more developed record. The court expressly stated that it had formed no opinion about the potential merits of the plaintiffs’ broader claims concerning alleged systemic favoritism toward Christianity.