UnifySCC v. Cody

Background

UnifySCC, an unincorporated association of exempt Santa Clara County employees in high-risk jobs, and two County employees, Tom Davis and Maria Ramirez, challenged the County’s COVID-19 vaccination policy. The policy required County personnel to be vaccinated and boosted, unless they received a medical, disability, or religious exemption. Employees with exemptions received accommodations based on the COVID-19 risk level of their positions.

Employees in lower-risk positions could wear a surgical mask and receive weekly COVID-19 testing. Employees in intermediate-risk positions could wear an N95 mask and receive two PCR tests each week. The County determined that exempt employees could not safely remain in high-risk positions, so it placed them on administrative leave while helping them seek transfers or reassignments to lower- or intermediate-risk positions. Employees with medical or disability exemptions received “priority consideration” for vacant positions under disability laws. Religious-exemption employees did not receive the same priority.

Davis and Ramirez had religious exemptions and were told they could not remain in their high-risk positions. Plaintiffs brought claims under the First Amendment’s Free Exercise Clause, the Fourteenth Amendment’s Equal Protection Clause, California’s Fair Employment and Housing Act, and a federal civil-rights law concerning local-government policies. They sought a preliminary injunction, which is temporary relief intended to preserve rights or the parties’ positions while a case proceeds.

Court’s analysis

The court applied the preliminary-injunction factors: whether Plaintiffs were likely to succeed, likely to suffer harm that money could not repair, whether the hardships favored an injunction, and whether an injunction served the public interest.

The court separately analyzed the vaccination mandate and the accommodations framework under the First Amendment. It found that the mandate applied to all County personnel and did not single out religious objectors. The County also exercised little discretion when reviewing religious-exemption requests, checking whether a request stated a religious rather than political or personal objection. The court concluded that Plaintiffs had not shown a likelihood of success against the mandate. It also found that the mandate would likely survive both rational-basis review, which asks whether a government policy is reasonably related to a legitimate purpose, and strict scrutiny, the more demanding test for policies that burden religious exercise without neutrality or general applicability.

The court likewise found that the general accommodations system was likely neutral and generally applicable. The system assigned positions to risk tiers without considering the reason for an employee’s exemption, and the different safety measures were related to reducing COVID-19 transmission. That part of the system was not enjoined.

The court reached a different conclusion about priority consideration for transfers. It found that favoring employees with medical or disability exemptions over employees with religious exemptions likely disadvantaged religious exercise. Because an unvaccinated employee posed the same transmission risk regardless of the reason for the exemption, the court found that the distinction was likely not neutral and likely could not satisfy strict scrutiny. The court clarified that the County could still evaluate applicants based on other criteria, such as relevant experience and minimum qualifications; it could not prioritize applicants based on the type of exemption they received.

Disposition

The court found that Plaintiffs had shown irreparable harm because the alleged loss of religious-freedom rights, even for a short period, could not be adequately repaired later. It also found that the balance of hardships and the public interest favored an injunction concerning the priority system. The County had not shown a hardship from ending that priority distinction, while preventing a likely constitutional violation served the public interest.

Judge Beth Labson Freeman granted in part and denied in part Plaintiffs’ motion for a preliminary injunction. The defendants and their agents, employees, and successors were restrained and enjoined from giving employees in high-risk positions priority for vacant County positions based on the type of exemption they received. The injunction was ordered to remain in effect during the case unless the court terminated it earlier. The court denied preliminary injunctive relief as to the rest of the policy.