Mickinzie T. v. Saul

Background

Mickinzie T. applied for Social Security Disabled Adult Child and Supplemental Security Income benefits on January 9, 2017, alleging disability beginning February 29, 2012. The application was denied initially and on reconsideration. After a hearing, an Administrative Law Judge (ALJ) found that Mickinzie T. had severe impairments including degenerative disc disease, pseudotumor cerebri, depression, bipolar disorder, and anxiety.

The ALJ determined that Mickinzie T. retained the residual functional capacity (RFC)—the most she could still do despite her impairments—to perform light work with physical, visual, and mental restrictions. The ALJ found that she could perform simple, routine, task-oriented work with few changes and occasional public contact. Relying on vocational-expert testimony, the ALJ found that she could not perform her past work but could perform other jobs existing in significant numbers in the national economy, including housekeeping cleaner, photocopy machine operator, and packing line worker. The ALJ therefore found her not disabled.

Motions and issue

Mickinzie T. moved for summary judgment, asking the court to reverse the Commissioner’s final decision and remand the case for an immediate award of benefits. The Commissioner agreed that the ALJ’s decision had to be reversed because the ALJ improperly evaluated the opinions of state-agency psychologists Dr. Borton and Dr. Morris, but asked for a remand for further administrative proceedings instead.

The remaining issue was the type of remand. The court considered whether the record required additional proceedings or whether the court should order an immediate award of benefits under the Ninth Circuit’s three-part “credit-as-true” standard. That standard requires that the record be fully developed, that the ALJ lack legally sufficient reasons for rejecting evidence, and that crediting the evidence as true would require a finding of disability.

Court’s analysis

Dr. Borton and Dr. Morris opined that Mickinzie T. could understand, remember, and carry out simple, unskilled one- to two-step tasks over a full workweek, along with having occasional public contact. The ALJ gave their opinions “great weight” but did not include the one- to two-step-task limitation in the RFC.

The parties agreed, and the court found, that the ALJ failed to provide legally sufficient reasons for rejecting that limitation. The court also found that the vocational expert’s testimony established that adding the one- to two-step-task limitation to the RFC would prevent Mickinzie T. from performing any jobs existing in significant numbers in the national economy.

The Commissioner argued that other medical opinions created a conflict requiring further proceedings. The court rejected that argument. It found that one opinion was too vague to conflict with the specific one- to two-step-task limitation and that three other opinions finding that Mickinzie T. could perform simple tasks were consistent with the state-agency psychologists’ more specific assessment. The court also found that the ALJ had already addressed the opinions and expressly found the specific limitation supported by the record and entitled to great weight.

The court concluded that further proceedings would serve no useful purpose and that the Commissioner had not identified specific evidence creating serious doubt that Mickinzie T. was disabled. The three parts of the credit-as-true standard were therefore satisfied.

Disposition

The court granted Mickinzie T.’s motion for summary judgment and request for a remand for an award of benefits. It denied the Commissioner’s motion for a remand for further proceedings and remanded the case for an immediate award of benefits.