Tamrat v. Marlowe

Background

Herman Tamrat, a former county detainee and current state prisoner proceeding without a lawyer, brought a civil-rights action under 42 U.S.C. § 1983. He alleged that deputies Adam Marlowe and Tamayo used excessive force against him. The defendants moved for summary judgment on the merits. Tamrat filed an opposition and, after viewing video evidence, a second opposition.

Tamrat had been held at the Sonoma County Main Adult Detention Facility. On June 9, 2019, he was classified as a Level 3 inmate because of his high propensity for violence. The classification required restraints and accompaniment by three correctional deputies when he was moved within the jail.

Marlowe, Tamayo, and another deputy approached Tamrat’s cell for a clothing exchange. After Tamrat was handcuffed and escorted away from the cell, he yelled, pulled away, planted his feet, tensed his body, and resisted efforts to move him. Tamayo and the other deputy pushed him against a wall to control him. Marlowe later replaced the other deputy and called for medical staff after noticing an abrasion on Tamrat’s wrist.

As the deputies moved Tamrat toward the housing-unit exit, he continued yelling and at times tried to stop walking or lower himself to the floor. Near the exit, he pulled away from Tamayo, turned toward Marlowe, and used a racial insult. The deputies pushed him against the glass exit door, took him to the ground, and applied wrist locks while another deputy controlled his legs. They stopped applying the holds once Tamrat stopped moving. The incident lasted about thirty seconds.

Tamrat suffered a cut above his eye and complained of wrist and finger pain. Medical staff treated the cut, and later imaging showed a small fracture at the corner of the right ulnar bone. The opinion also noted that an earlier hand X-ray did not show a fractured finger and that an ankle examination and X-ray showed no injury.

Legal standard

For a post-arraignment, pretrial detainee, the Fourteenth Amendment prohibits force that amounts to punishment. Under the standard from Kingsley v. Hendrickson, the question is whether the force was objectively unreasonable from the perspective of a reasonable officer at the scene. Relevant considerations include the need for force, the amount used, the extent of injury, efforts to limit the force, the security problem, the threat reasonably perceived, and whether the detainee was actively resisting.

Summary judgment is appropriate when the evidence shows no genuine dispute about a material fact and the moving party is entitled to judgment as a matter of law. Once the moving party meets its burden, the opposing party must identify specific evidence showing a genuine issue for trial.

Court’s analysis

The court found that the video evidence refuted Tamrat’s allegations that the deputies injured his ankle while moving him away from his cell and repeatedly slammed his face into the wall or lifted him from the ground. The video instead showed the deputies moving him at a normal pace while he planted his legs and resisted. The court concluded that the force used during that portion of the escort was reasonable in response to his resistance.

The court acknowledged that Tamrat was injured when the deputies pushed him against the door and took him to the ground. It nevertheless found the force objectively reasonable. Tamrat had resisted being moved, was yelling in a way that disturbed other inmates, suddenly pulled away while handcuffed, and turned toward Marlowe. The deputies did not strike him or use a weapon, stopped the wrist and leg holds when he stopped resisting, and arranged for medical treatment shortly afterward. Considering these facts and the Kingsley factors, the court concluded that Tamrat had not shown that the force was objectively unreasonable.

Qualified immunity

Qualified immunity protects government officials from civil damages unless their conduct violated a constitutional right that was clearly established at the time. The court found no constitutional violation. It also held that, even if there had been a violation, a reasonable deputy would not have known that using wrist restraints while a detainee resisted, or briefly pushing a resisting detainee against a door and to the ground, was unlawful in these circumstances. The court therefore held that the defendants were entitled to qualified immunity.

Disposition

The court GRANTED the defendants’ motion for summary judgment. It DENIED Tamrat’s motions, identified as Docket Nos. 61 and 67, and directed the clerk to close the case.