Lenk v. Monolithic Power Systems, Inc.
- Beth Freeman
- 5:20-cv-08094
- U.S. District Court · Northern District of California
- 2
In Lenk v. Monolithic Power Systems, Judge Freeman denied Lenk’s request to change the judgment because he showed no qualifying basis under Rule 59(e).
Kenneth Lawrence Lenk and Monolithic Power Systems, Inc.; the prior dismissal judgment remained unchanged.
What happened
Lenk v. Monolithic Power Systems, Inc. involved Kenneth Lawrence Lenk’s request to change or amend the judgment under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 59(e). The court had previously dismissed all of Lenk’s claims against Monolithic Power Systems, Inc.
Lenk argued that the earlier dismissal contained legal and factual errors. He also referred to possible new evidence supporting his blacklisting claims, argued that dismissal was unjust, and identified laws that he said supported relief. The court found that these arguments largely repeated issues it had already considered and did not establish a qualifying reason to change the judgment.
The court denied Lenk’s motion to alter or amend the judgment and terminated the motion. Judge Beth Labson Freeman stated that Lenk had not shown a manifest error, new evidence, manifest injustice, or an intervening change in controlling law warranting relief.
The detailed version
- Lenk v. Monolithic Power Systems, Inc. · No. 5:20-cv-08094
- Beth Freeman
- Feb. 15, 2022
Background
Kenneth Lawrence Lenk moved under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 59(e) to alter or amend the judgment in his case against Monolithic Power Systems, Inc. The court reviewed Lenk’s motion, the defendant’s opposition, and Lenk’s reply. The motion was decided without oral argument.
The opinion states that the court’s earlier dismissal order dismissed all of Lenk’s claims on one or more grounds, including the Noerr-Pennington doctrine, claim preclusion, issue preclusion, the statute of limitations, and failure to allege sufficient facts. The opinion also states that this was the fourth lawsuit Lenk had litigated in the eight years since separating from employment with the defendant.
Rule 59(e) Standard
A Rule 59(e) motion may be granted when necessary to correct a clear legal or factual error underlying the judgment, consider newly discovered or previously unavailable evidence, prevent a manifest injustice, or address an intervening change in controlling law. The court described this as an extraordinary remedy to be used sparingly.
Court’s Analysis
The court concluded that Lenk had not shown a basis for this extraordinary remedy. Although he claimed the dismissal order contained legal and factual errors, the court found that he was simply disagreeing with conclusions it had already reached. Repeating arguments previously considered and rejected did not justify relief.
The court also found that Lenk had not presented new evidence. His statement that he had taken steps to obtain evidence supporting his blacklisting claims, and expected to receive it in the next few weeks, was insufficient. The court further found that Lenk had not shown that dismissal was manifestly unjust, noting that he had received numerous opportunities to state a viable claim. Finally, the court found no intervening change in controlling law because the laws Lenk identified had been enacted and taken effect before he filed this lawsuit.
Disposition
Judge Beth Labson Freeman denied Lenk’s motion to alter or amend the judgment under Rule 59(e). The order terminated the motion identified as ECF 34. The opinion does not add a prejudice designation to the denial.
Read the full 2-page opinion on CourtListener, the free public archive maintained by the Free Law Project.