Smith v. Diaz

Background

C. Jay Smith, an incarcerated transgender woman serving a 25-years-to-life sentence with the possibility of parole, alleged that she was sexually assaulted by another incarcerated person while housed at San Quentin State Prison from 2013 to 2019. She alleged that San Quentin and the California Department of Corrections and Rehabilitation failed to implement provisions of the Prison Rape Elimination Act. She also alleged that, after she reported the assault, staff failed to investigate adequately and retaliated by falsifying three Rules Violation Reports.

Smith brought claims under 42 U.S.C. § 1983, a federal law allowing claims against state officials for violations of constitutional rights. The claims included an Eighth Amendment failure-to-protect claim, Fourteenth Amendment equal-protection and retaliation claims, and a Fourteenth Amendment due-process claim concerning the disciplinary reports. The defendants who filed this motion challenged the failure-to-protect claim and the due-process claim. They also challenged Smith’s request for injunctive relief concerning San Quentin.

Judicial Notice

The defendants asked the court to take judicial notice of four Rules Violation Reports. The court did not take judicial notice of the truth of the reports’ factual allegations because those allegations were reasonably disputable. It did take judicial notice of the charges, the fact that Smith was found guilty, and the punishment imposed.

Failure-to-Protect Claim

For an Eighth Amendment failure-to-protect claim under § 1983, Smith had to allege an objectively serious risk and that the officials knew of and disregarded a substantial risk of serious harm. The court held that the complaint did not provide facts supporting an inference that Ralph Diaz or Ron Davis was deliberately indifferent. The court also held that Smith had not adequately connected the alleged failure to implement Prison Rape Elimination Act rules to her injury. The court therefore granted the motion to dismiss the Eighth Amendment claim, with leave to amend.

Due-Process Claim

Smith alleged that R. Feston, B. Haub, and M. Bloise violated her procedural due-process rights by falsifying and improperly handling appeals from three Rules Violation Reports. The defendants argued that the claim was barred by the rule from Heck v. Humphrey, which can prevent a damages claim when success would necessarily undermine a conviction or sentence. The court concluded that the rule did not bar Smith’s claim because, given her indeterminate 25-years-to-life sentence, restoration of good-time credits would not necessarily affect the length of time she must serve. The defendants conceded this point during oral argument.

The court also held that Smith had sufficiently pleaded a procedural due-process claim. The complaint identified the specific protections she allegedly did not receive and described each defendant’s involvement. The court denied the motion to dismiss as to the Fourteenth Amendment due-process claim.

Injunctive Relief

The defendants argued that Smith’s request for an injunction concerning San Quentin was moot, meaning that the court no longer had a live dispute to resolve. The court agreed. Smith had been transferred from San Quentin to the California Medical Facility in Vacaville, California, before filing the action, had not been housed at San Quentin since 2019, and had not shown a reasonable expectation or probability of returning there. The court held that her assertion that she might be transferred back was too speculative.

The court granted the motion as to the claim for injunctive relief concerning San Quentin, without leave to amend.

Disposition

The order granted in part and denied in part the defendants’ motion to dismiss as follows:

The stay of the response deadline for defendants T. Duke, Y. Franco, and M. Taylor remained in place until 21 days after the order was filed.