Garrett v. Governing Board of Oakland Unified School District

Background

Gina Garrett and Leslie Tavernier sued the Governing Board of Trustees of the Oakland Unified School District and three district employees—Kyla Johnson-Trammell, Tara Gard, and Jenine Lindsey—in their individual capacities. Garrett and Tavernier alleged that they were discriminatorily disciplined or terminated. Each plaintiff asserted claims under the Fourteenth Amendment’s Equal Protection Clause, due-process claims under the Fifth and Fourteenth Amendments, and claims under California’s Fair Employment and Housing Act.

Tavernier alleged that some financial analysts received stipends while four others did not, three of whom were Black employees about 60 years old. She alleged that Gard intentionally withheld the stipends and that Tavernier processed them herself after opposing the unequal treatment. Tavernier was placed on administrative leave and later terminated for financial mismanagement. She alleged that Lindsey investigated her and later acted as the prosecutor in her disciplinary hearing after representing herself as neutral.

Garrett alleged that Johnson-Trammell approved the hiring of Preston Thomas, a white man, as Garrett’s supervisor even though he allegedly lacked relevant school-finance and financial-management experience. Garrett objected to Thomas evaluating her, was placed on paid administrative leave pending an investigation, and was later told that her position would be eliminated for lack of funds. She also alleged that the district later advertised a similar position without notifying her.

Rulings on the School Board

The court granted the school board’s motion to dismiss with prejudice and dismissed the board from the action with prejudice. The court held that California school districts are treated as state agencies for purposes of constitutional sovereign immunity, and that immunity also extended to the district’s governing board because the board’s authority was coextensive with the district’s authority.

The court found that no exception to that immunity applied. The plaintiffs primarily sought damages for past injuries, and the court also found that they lacked standing to seek prospective injunctive relief because they were no longer employed by the district and had not shown that they were likely to suffer similar injuries in the future.

Equal Protection Claims Against the Individual Defendants

The court dismissed Tavernier’s Equal Protection claims with leave to amend. Her allegations that she was punished for opposing unequal stipend treatment did not plausibly allege that the discipline was motivated by discrimination based on her protected status. Her allegation that she was treated differently from Gard also did not plausibly allege discriminatory intent.

The court found that Garrett plausibly alleged a sex-discrimination claim under the Equal Protection Clause. At the motion-to-dismiss stage, the court accepted her allegations that she was qualified, that she suffered an adverse employment action, and that a less-qualified man outside her protected class received the position. The court denied the individual defendants’ motion to dismiss this claim in its entirety as to Johnson-Trammell. Because the complaint did not allege that Gard or Lindsey participated in hiring Thomas, the court dismissed the claim against those two defendants.

The court dismissed the plaintiffs’ Equal Protection retaliation claims without leave to amend based on qualified immunity. Qualified immunity generally protects government officials from damages when the alleged conduct did not violate a clearly established constitutional right. The court assumed, without deciding, that retaliation could support an Equal Protection claim, but held that such a right was not clearly established under Supreme Court or Ninth Circuit precedent.

Due-Process Claims

The court dismissed the plaintiffs’ Fifth Amendment due-process claims with prejudice and without leave to amend because the defendants were state officials and the Fifth Amendment applies to the federal government.

The court dismissed the Fourteenth Amendment procedural-due-process claims because the complaint did not allege that the plaintiffs had used available state remedies, including a state-court administrative mandate proceeding to challenge their adverse administrative decisions. The court allowed leave to amend so the plaintiffs could allege, if true, that they had exhausted those remedies.

The court also dismissed the substantive-due-process claims. It held that the plaintiffs had not shown a protected property or liberty deprivation. The court stated that existing precedent did not clearly establish a substantive-due-process right to continued public employment, and the complaint did not allege that the defendants’ actions foreclosed the plaintiffs’ access to their professions. The court nevertheless allowed leave to amend the occupational-liberty theory.

California Employment Claims and Proposed Age Claim

The court dismissed the FEHA claims with leave to amend because the complaint was conclusory, did not identify which individual defendants allegedly violated the statute, and did not state the basic elements of a FEHA claim. The court noted that individuals cannot be held liable under FEHA for discrimination or retaliation claims.

Tavernier requested leave to add a claim under the Age Discrimination in Employment Act. The court denied that request, finding amendment futile because the statute did not allow suit against the individual defendants and sovereign immunity protected the school district and its governing board from the proposed claim.

Disposition

The court granted the OUSD Board’s motion to dismiss with prejudice. It granted in part and denied in part the Individual Defendants’ motion to dismiss: it denied the motion as to Garrett’s sex-discrimination claim against Johnson-Trammell and granted it as to the remaining claims, subject to the amendment permissions described above. Any amended complaint had to be filed within 28 days and could not add new causes of action or defendants. Judge Haywood S. Gilliam, Jr. also set a telephonic case-management conference.