Aetna Inc. v. Gilead Sciences, Inc.

Background

Aetna filed its first lawsuit, referred to in the opinion as “Aetna I,” in state court against Gilead, BMS, and Janssen. Aetna asserted only state-law claims. Gilead removed the case to federal court, relying on diversity jurisdiction and federal-question jurisdiction. Gilead argued that the claims raised substantial federal issues involving patent law, the Hatch-Waxman Act, Food and Drug Administration regulations, and federal antitrust law.

Aetna moved to return Aetna I to state court. Before Gilead filed its opposition to that motion, Aetna filed a notice of voluntary dismissal under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 41. At that time, no defendant had filed an answer or a motion for summary judgment. Aetna also filed a substantially similar case in state court, called “Aetna II,” which Gilead later removed to federal court.

Issue and parties’ arguments

The defendants moved to vacate, or set aside, Aetna’s voluntary dismissal of Aetna I. They argued that Rule 41’s reference to “any applicable federal statute” included the federal removal statutes and the All Writs Act. In their view, those laws gave the court authority to prevent Aetna from using dismissal and a new state-court filing to undermine the federal court’s removal jurisdiction. They also argued that vacating the dismissal would promote efficiency by keeping related cases before one court.

Court’s reasoning

Rule 41(a)(1)(A)(i) generally allows a plaintiff to dismiss an action without a court order by filing a notice before the opposing party serves an answer or a motion for summary judgment. The court explained that Rule 41’s references to other rules and federal statutes concern special situations in which court approval protects third parties, addresses special case-management needs, or safeguards important interests beyond those of the immediate parties.

The court held that the removal statutes and the All Writs Act did not qualify as such an applicable federal statute for purposes of limiting Aetna’s Rule 41 dismissal. None of those provisions expressly required court approval before Aetna could voluntarily dismiss. The court also concluded that the statutes did not involve comparable special policy concerns, unique case-management issues, or protection of third parties. The court distinguished authority recognizing power to enjoin a later state-court action after removal, reasoning that such authority did not imply power to prevent a dismissal under Rule 41.

The court further stated that even accepting the defendants’ characterization of Aetna’s actions as an attempt to undermine federal jurisdiction, that conduct was not enough to create an exception to Rule 41. The court also found that granting relief would not necessarily achieve the defendants’ efficiency goal because Aetna II might itself be remanded, leaving related suits in two venues.

Disposition

The court denied defendants’ motion to vacate the voluntary dismissal of Aetna I. The order disposed of the motion identified as Docket No. 863 in the related Staley action and Docket No. 19 in Aetna I.