Shahid Buttar for Congress Committee v. Hearst Communications, Inc.

Background

Shahid Buttar and Shahid Buttar for Congress Committee sued Hearst Communications, Inc., alleging defamation and a derivative violation of California’s unfair competition law. The claims arose from two San Francisco Chronicle articles published in July 2020 about allegations by Elizabeth Croydon that Buttar had sexually harassed her years earlier.

The first article reported Croydon’s online essay, Buttar’s denial, and the reactions of political organizations and others who had supported his candidacy. The follow-up article reported on an open letter supporting Buttar and quoted people who defended his character. Plaintiffs alleged that Hearst’s reporting was misleading because it did not sufficiently investigate Croydon’s credibility, interview preferred sources, or report allegations that Croydon had falsely accused others. Plaintiffs also alleged that the reporting harmed Buttar’s campaign, reputation, livelihood, and opportunities.

Hearst moved to dismiss under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6), which allows dismissal for failure to state a legally sufficient claim, and moved to strike under California’s anti-SLAPP statute. That statute permits early dismissal of claims arising from protected speech when the plaintiff cannot show a probability of prevailing. Plaintiffs conceded that the articles concerned speech covered by the statute, so the court focused on whether plaintiffs showed a probability of success.

Defamation analysis

The court explained that because the articles concerned a public issue and Buttar was a public figure, plaintiffs had to show that the challenged statements were materially false and establish a likelihood of proving actual malice by clear and convincing evidence. Actual malice means that the publisher knew a statement was false or acted with reckless disregard for whether it was false. The court said that a failure to investigate, by itself, does not establish actual malice.

The court first noted that plaintiffs did not identify any specific statement in the articles that was false. The first article accurately reported that Croydon had made allegations, that Buttar denied them, and that some political supporters had reconsidered their support. The court also found that Hearst did not present Croydon’s allegations as established facts; it reported them as disputed, unproven claims.

Plaintiffs instead relied primarily on Hearst’s failure to interview or quote their preferred sources and its failure to report additional attacks on Croydon’s credibility. The court found no allegation that those sources had firsthand knowledge about whether Croydon’s allegations against Buttar were true or false. The court also found no basis to conclude that omitting those sources made the articles provably false or would have changed the overall effect of the reporting on readers.

The court rejected plaintiffs’ allegation that the follow-up article falsely portrayed supporters as friends rather than independent political activists, finding that the article described their backgrounds and affiliations. The court acknowledged that the follow-up article did not include some statements in the open letter attacking Croydon’s credibility and said plaintiffs arguably alleged enough to plead falsity as to that omission. Even assuming falsity, however, the court held that plaintiffs did not plausibly plead actual malice.

The court found that plaintiffs’ allegations about Hearst’s editorial choices and failure to investigate did not show that Hearst entertained serious doubts about the truth of its reporting. It also found that an email sent after the first article was published could not establish actual malice in the earlier publication. Finally, the court found no supporting facts for plaintiffs’ claim that Hearst acted maliciously because Buttar was an immigrant Muslim.

Correction notice and damages

The court also held that plaintiffs had not adequately pleaded compliance with California Civil Code § 48a. That statute requires a libel plaintiff seeking certain damages from a news publisher to give timely written notice identifying the allegedly libelous statements and demanding correction. The court found that the campaign’s email to a reporter sought additional coverage and an opportunity for Buttar to present his perspective; it did not make the required correction demand to the publisher.

The court further held that plaintiffs did not plead specific special damages, meaning concrete financial losses tied to the alleged libel. The complaint alleged general harm to Buttar’s reputation, livelihood, relationships, speaking opportunities, and political prospects, but did not identify specific amounts of money lost or spent. The court also noted that other publications had reported on the allegations, making it insufficiently clear that the claimed harm was attributable specifically to Hearst’s articles.

Disposition

The court concluded that plaintiffs failed to state a defamation claim because they did not plausibly allege actual malice and did not plead compliance with the correction statute or facts supporting special damages. It therefore granted Hearst’s motion to dismiss.

The court granted plaintiffs leave to amend their claims stemming from the follow-up article and required any amended complaint to be filed within 30 days. It held that amendment would be futile for claims stemming from the first article, so those claims were dismissed with prejudice. The court withheld ruling on Hearst’s request for anti-SLAPP fees and costs at that stage. The opinion does not separately analyze the unfair-competition claim beyond describing it as derivative of the defamation claim.