MacMillan v. City and County of San Francisco

Background

Brendan and Melanie MacMillan and their children sued the City and County of San Francisco, Nicole Stein, and Molly Braun under 42 U.S.C. § 1983. They alleged violations of the Fourth and Fourteenth Amendments arising from events involving their sixteen-year-old daughter, Margaret.

After a University of California, San Francisco physician recommended that Margaret be hospitalized because of reported weight loss, a low heart rate, and missed periods, Margaret and her parents declined hospitalization. A physician then reported possible child abuse to San Francisco’s Department of Family and Children’s Services. Social worker Nicole Stein obtained warrants and related court orders authorizing officials to take custody of Margaret, question the children outside their parents’ presence, photograph alleged injuries, and arrange a medical assessment.

The plaintiffs alleged that Stein omitted material information from the warrant applications, including the family’s explanations for Margaret’s weight and heart rate, their efforts to obtain a cardiology opinion, and later medical examinations in Texas that found Margaret healthy. They also alleged that investigator Molly Braun added the family to a missing-persons database. Brendan was detained for hours at Miami International Airport when he returned to the country, and the other family members were subjected to a welfare check in Massachusetts.

Claims and Analysis

The plaintiffs asserted four § 1983 claims: a Fourteenth Amendment judicial-deception claim against Stein; a Fourteenth Amendment right-to-travel claim against Stein and Braun; a municipal-liability claim against San Francisco under Monell v. Department of Social Services; and a Fourth Amendment unreasonable-seizure claim based on Brendan’s airport detention.

The court held that the alleged omissions from the warrant applications plausibly supported a judicial-deception claim. A corrected application might not have established probable cause because the omitted information showed that the family was seeking additional medical opinions rather than simply ignoring medical advice.

The court also held that the allegations plausibly showed interference with the plaintiffs’ right to travel. The outstanding warrants, the family’s placement in a missing-persons database, the Massachusetts welfare check, and Brendan’s temporary detention were sufficient at the motion-to-dismiss stage.

The court declined to dismiss the substantive due-process allegations. It applied the “deliberate indifference” standard and held that, based on the alleged facts, it could not conclude at the pleading stage that the defendants’ conduct could not amount to a constitutional violation.

The court dismissed the Monell theories based on an allegedly unconstitutional policy or practice and on a policymaker theory because the allegations were too vague and did not allege that the identified senior officials had final policymaking authority. The failure-to-train theory survived because the plaintiffs plausibly alleged that San Francisco failed to train employees about including material information in warrant applications, handling contradictory medical opinions, and protecting family rights during child-welfare investigations.

The court dismissed with prejudice the Fourth Amendment claims of Melanie, Margaret, and L.M. because they alleged no independent search or seizure and could not assert Brendan’s Fourth Amendment claim for them. Brendan’s claim survived because his alleged hours-long detention at the airport plausibly constituted a seizure caused by false information in the missing-persons database.

The court also declined to dismiss the claims against Braun based on qualified immunity. At this stage, the court held that existing precedent concerning wrongful placement on a federal aviation security list placed the constitutional question beyond debate sufficiently for Braun’s claims to proceed.

Disposition

Judge Beeler granted in part and denied in part the defendants’ motion to dismiss. She dismissed with prejudice the Fourth Amendment claims of Melanie, Margaret, and L.M. She dismissed without prejudice the Monell claims based on the policy-or-practice and policymaker theories, allowing the plaintiffs 28 days to amend those theories. The motion was otherwise denied, and the remaining claims could proceed.