Barno v. Padilla

Background

Rodney Bernard Barno, who was incarcerated at the Correction Training Facility, filed this self-represented civil-rights action under 42 U.S.C. § 1983. He alleged that correctional officers Armando Padilla, Derrek Campagna, A. Kuster, Alvin Saint-Louis, and Gaylen Woods retaliated against him for protected First Amendment activity, including filing prison grievances and pursuing civil-rights litigation. The court had previously dismissed Barno’s due-process claim and other claims; a claim against Lara was later dismissed by stipulation.

The remaining claims concerned several events from 2018 and 2019. Claim 1 involved the February 8, 2019 podium incident, Barno’s bunkmate assignment, alleged threats and physical mistreatment, a disciplinary report, and Padilla’s disciplinary hearing decision. Claim 2 concerned Campagna’s October 8, 2018 search of Barno’s living area. Claim 3 alleged that Padilla, Campagna, and Saint-Louis threatened Barno if he continued litigation. Claim 4 alleged that Campagna tried to discourage Barno from helping another prisoner file a grievance. Claim 5 challenged Kuster’s involvement in a March 13, 2019 housing move and alleged punitive living conditions. Claim 6 alleged that Campagna forced Barno to live with an incompatible inmate.

Legal standards

The court applied the summary-judgment standard under Rule 56. Summary judgment is appropriate when the evidence shows no genuine dispute about a material fact and the moving party is entitled to judgment as a matter of law. The court was required to view the evidence favorably to Barno and could not resolve credibility disputes.

For a prisoner retaliation claim, Barno had to provide evidence that a state actor took adverse action because of protected conduct, that the action would chill a person of ordinary firmness from exercising First Amendment rights, and that the action did not reasonably advance a legitimate correctional goal. The defendants also raised failure to exhaust administrative remedies. Exhaustion requires a prisoner to properly complete available prison grievance procedures before bringing a federal action.

Claim 3: failure to exhaust

The court granted summary judgment on the defense that Barno failed to exhaust Claim 3. The undisputed evidence showed that California provided an available grievance system and that Barno had used it for other events, but none of his grievances raised the alleged threats by Padilla, Campagna, and Saint-Louis concerning his continued litigation. Barno did not show that the grievance process was unavailable to him. The court therefore dismissed Claim 3 without prejudice to Barno filing a new action after properly exhausting the administrative process.

Claims decided on the merits

For Claim 1, the court granted summary judgment to Campagna, Woods, Saint-Louis, and Padilla. Regarding Campagna, the court said Barno had not produced enough evidence for a reasonable jury to find that the bunkmate issue, changes to the disciplinary report, or the alleged statements about discipline were retaliatory. Regarding Saint-Louis, even accepting Barno’s version of disputed facts, the evidence did not show that the handcuffing, removal to a holding cell, or alleged threats were undertaken because of Barno’s grievance activity rather than a legitimate correctional purpose. The court also found insufficient evidence that Woods acted because of Barno’s desire to file grievances. As to Padilla, Barno offered only conclusory assertions that Padilla’s disciplinary decision was retaliatory; the court found that insufficient to create a genuine factual dispute.

For Claim 2, the court granted summary judgment to Campagna. It concluded that Barno’s comment about a prison official’s appearance was not protected conduct under the authorities discussed by the court. The court further found that Barno had not shown a causal connection between the comment and the search, had not rebutted the legitimate security purpose of routine searches, and had not shown the search would chill a person of ordinary firmness from future First Amendment activity.

For Claim 4, the court granted summary judgment to Campagna. The court held that helping another prisoner file a grievance was not protected activity under the First Amendment and therefore could not support this retaliation claim.

For Claim 5, the court granted summary judgment to Kuster. The court found no genuine dispute about retaliatory motive because Barno offered only conclusory assertions and no evidence that Kuster knew about his grievances. The record instead showed that the housing move followed a disciplinary proceeding that resulted in lost privileges, and prison officials stated that inmates could be moved after disciplinary action.

For Claim 6, the court granted summary judgment to Campagna. The court noted a factual dispute about whether Barno was actually housed with an incompatible inmate, but held that even if he was, the alleged housing inconvenience was no more than a minor inconvenience and was not actionable retaliation under the First Amendment.

Punitive damages and disposition

The court dismissed Barno’s punitive-damages claim because the record did not indicate that the defendants’ alleged conduct involved the level of evil motive, intent, reckless disregard, or callous indifference required for punitive damages in a § 1983 action.

Judge Susan Illston granted the defendants’ motion for summary judgment in its entirety. Claim 3 was dismissed without prejudice to refiling after exhaustion, and the punitive-damages claim was dismissed. The clerk was directed to terminate pending motions and close the file.