Doe v. San Jose Unified School District Board

Background

The Fellowship of Christian Athletes, the Pioneer High School FCA student chapter, and two former student members sued the San Jose Unified School District and its officials. They alleged violations of the Equal Access Act, the First Amendment’s Establishment, Free Exercise, Free Speech, and Freedom of Assembly Clauses, and the Fourteenth Amendment.

The plaintiffs alleged that FCA student chapters at Pioneer, Willow Glen, and Leland high schools had previously been recognized under the District’s Associated Student Body program. They alleged that the District revoked recognition in or around May 2019 after a teacher posted FCA’s Statement of Faith and a version of its Sexual Purity Statement. FCA’s materials required student leaders to affirm FCA’s Christian beliefs and comply with standards stating that sexual expression belongs in a marriage between one man and one woman.

After losing recognition, Pioneer FCA continued meeting on campus as a student interest group but lacked benefits associated with official recognition, such as access to ASB bank accounts and yearbook listings. The plaintiffs sought a mandatory preliminary injunction requiring the District to recognize FCA-affiliated chapters, including Pioneer FCA, as official ASB clubs.

Legal standard

A preliminary injunction is an extraordinary remedy. The moving party must clearly show a likelihood of success on the merits, likely irreparable harm without an injunction, that the balance of equities favors relief, and that an injunction serves the public interest. A mandatory injunction requiring a party to take action is particularly disfavored, and the facts and law must clearly favor the moving party.

Analysis

The court treated the requested injunction as mandatory because it would change the existing situation by requiring the District to recognize FCA clubs. It held that the plaintiffs did not meet the heightened standard for that type of relief.

The court first addressed the District’s nondiscrimination policy, which included Board Policies 0410 and 5145.3 and the ASB Affirmation Form. The policy required ASB clubs to allow enrolled students to participate, become members, and seek or hold leadership positions regardless of protected characteristics, including religion and sexual orientation. It allowed clubs to adopt criteria that were not discriminatory on those bases.

The court noted that Judge Koh had previously dismissed the plaintiffs’ facial challenges to the policy with prejudice. Independently, the court agreed that the policy as written was constitutional and did not violate the Equal Access Act.

On the First Amendment claims, the court applied the limited-public-forum doctrine, which permits reasonable and viewpoint-neutral rules for a government-sponsored forum. The court found the policy reasonable in light of the ASB program’s purpose of connecting students and giving them equal access to school activities. It also found the policy neutral as to content and viewpoint because it addressed discriminatory conduct rather than suppressing particular messages. The plaintiffs therefore were unlikely to prevail on their free-speech and expressive-association claims.

The court likewise found that the policy was a neutral rule of general application that did not impose a special disability on religious groups. For that reason, the plaintiffs had not clearly shown a violation of the Free Exercise Clause. The court also rejected the Equal Protection claim because including religion among the policy’s protected characteristics did not show that the plaintiffs had been singled out for unequal treatment based on religion.

Under the Equal Access Act, public secondary schools with a limited open forum may not deny equal access or discriminate against student meetings based on the content of their speech. The court concluded that the District’s policy was content-neutral because it prohibited discriminatory conduct rather than religious speech. The plaintiffs therefore were unlikely to prevail on their Equal Access Act claim concerning the written policy.

The court rejected the plaintiffs’ argument that the policy created a discretionary exception process like the one discussed in Fulton v. City of Philadelphia. The District’s policies did not reserve power for officials to grant exceptions allowing discrimination based on religion, sexual orientation, or another protected characteristic. The court concluded that requiring officials to enforce the nondiscrimination rule did not give them unfettered discretion.

The court also considered the plaintiffs’ claim that the policy was selectively enforced. It found that the examples involving other student groups did not clearly show that the District knowingly allowed ASB clubs to violate the policy. The record also showed that the District had implemented procedures requiring ASB clubs to confirm their commitment to the policy. The court concluded that the plaintiffs had not clearly shown selective enforcement.

The court recognized that denial of ASB recognition could cause injury if the District had violated the Constitution or the Equal Access Act. But FCA chapters could still meet and hold events on campus, and Pioneer FCA had done so. The court ultimately concluded that the balance of competing interests did not strongly favor the mandatory injunction.

Disposition

The court denied the plaintiffs’ motion for a preliminary injunction. It overruled the defendants’ evidentiary objections at Docket No. 112 and, as a result, terminated as moot the plaintiffs’ motion to strike at Docket No. 114. It denied the defendants’ administrative motion at Docket No. 119 and the plaintiffs’ motions at Docket Nos. 125 and 192 to supplement the preliminary-injunction record. It granted the plaintiffs’ administrative motion at Docket No. 177 for leave to supplement that record.