Goyette v. City of Minneapolis

Background

The individual plaintiffs are journalists, photographers, and other members of the press. The Communications Workers of America, an international labor union representing news-media workers, is also a plaintiff. The plaintiffs alleged that Minnesota Department of Public Safety Commissioner John Harrington, Minnesota State Patrol Colonel Matthew Langer, and their agents engaged in a pattern of violating press members’ constitutional rights while they documented protests.

The plaintiffs previously sought a temporary restraining order, but the court denied that motion without prejudice because the protests had quelled and the plaintiffs had not shown an imminent threat of harm. After additional protests connected to the trial of Derek Chauvin and the shooting death of Daunte Wright, the plaintiffs alleged continuing violations against the press. They cited dispersal orders despite press exemptions from curfews, physical force, chemical agents, less-lethal projectiles, threats, and interference with their ability to observe and record events.

Temporary restraining order analysis

Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 65 permits a court to issue a temporary restraining order. The court applied four factors: the plaintiffs’ likelihood of success, the threat of irreparable harm, the balance between the parties’ hardships, and the public interest.

Likelihood of success

For the First Amendment retaliation claim, the court concluded that the plaintiffs had a fair chance of proving that they engaged in protected activity, experienced actions that would chill a person of ordinary firmness, and were targeted at least partly because of that activity.

The court held that photographing, filming, and otherwise documenting government conduct at protests are constitutionally protected news-gathering activities. It also concluded that the protests appeared to take place primarily on public streets and sidewalks, where the press has a qualified right of access. The State Defendants did not show that general dispersal orders excluding the press were essential and narrowly tailored to protect higher interests. The court emphasized that curfew orders exempted the press and that narrower approaches were possible.

The court also found that the alleged use of dispersal orders, physical force, less-lethal projectiles, pepper spray, threats, and arrests could chill ordinary journalists. Declarations described journalists being ordered to leave, physically grabbed, struck by projectiles, pepper sprayed, and injured. The court further found that statements directed specifically at journalists and incidents involving identifiable members of the press supported an inference that the conduct was motivated at least partly by their protected activity.

The plaintiffs also showed a likelihood of success on their Fourth Amendment claims. The court explained that the Fourth Amendment protects against seizures and excessive force. It concluded that the alleged dispersal orders, threats, physical force, pepper spray, tear gas, batons, and less-lethal projectiles could constitute unreasonable restraints on the press’s movement.

Irreparable harm, balance of harms, and public interest

The court found that the harm was no longer speculative because protests were continuing and future interactions between the State Defendants and members of the press were imminent. The plaintiffs intended to continue covering the protests, and the court treated the likely loss of First Amendment freedoms as irreparable harm.

The balance of harms favored the plaintiffs because a properly limited order could protect press freedom while preserving the government’s ability to exercise its police powers. The public interest also favored protecting the press’s constitutional rights and the public’s ability to learn about events of public importance.

Order and other rulings

The court granted the plaintiffs’ motion for a temporary restraining order. It enjoined the State Defendants from the following actions against people they knew or reasonably should have known were journalists:

- Arresting, threatening to arrest, or using physical force unless they had probable cause to believe the journalist committed a crime. Journalists were not required to disperse under a general dispersal order and could not be arrested for failing to disperse, although they remained subject to other laws. - Using chemical agents unless the journalist presented an imminent threat of violence or bodily harm to people or damage to property. - Seizing photographic, audio-recording, or video-recording equipment or press passes, or ordering journalists to stop photographing, recording, or observing a protest, unless the seizure was lawful under the order.

The order required a written property list and prompt efforts to obtain a search warrant, subpoena, or other court order when property taken during a lawful arrest was needed as evidence. It also required the State Defendants to distribute the order within 24 hours to specified personnel deployed in Brooklyn Center, Minnesota, and their supervisors. The order did not bar otherwise lawful crowd-dispersal orders and did not impose liability for a journalist’s incidental exposure to crowd-control devices after remaining in an area where those devices were deployed under a lawful dispersal order.

The court waived the requirement that the plaintiffs provide security under Rule 65(c), authorized mutual expedited discovery, and directed the parties to propose a schedule for a preliminary-injunction hearing. The temporary restraining order was set to expire 14 days after entry unless extended by agreement of the parties or further court order.