Huemer v. Santa Cruz County Animal Shelter Foundation

Background

The case arose from two 2020 raids of Eeyore’s Hen Harbor, an animal rescue and rehabilitation organization founded by Ariana Huemer. The Santa Cruz County Animal Shelter Foundation, described in the opinion as an agency of the County of Santa Cruz, and individual agency employees Melanie Sobel, Todd Stosuy, and Carlos Montes allegedly searched Hen Harbor and seized birds and other animals. The first raid occurred on September 21, 2020, and involved a small number of ill birds and approximately 200 healthy birds. The second occurred on October 2, 2020, and involved 80 healthy birds.

Huemer obtained a hearing after each seizure. According to the amended complaint, the judicial officer ordered the agency to return all animals and property seized in the two raids. Some animals were returned, but hundreds were not. Huemer alleged that she had frequently and publicly criticized the agency and its employees, including criticism connected to the 2020 CZU fire.

The amended complaint added Hen Harbor as a plaintiff and asserted claims for First Amendment retaliation, deprivation of property without procedural due process under the Fourteenth Amendment, unreasonable seizure under the Fourteenth Amendment, municipal liability under Monell v. Department of Social Services, violation of California’s Bane Act, conversion, strict liability for bailors, and trespass to land.

Judicial Notice

The court granted defendants’ unopposed request for judicial notice of two public seizure notices dated September 21, 2020, and October 2, 2020. Judicial notice allows a court to consider certain facts or documents whose accuracy cannot reasonably be questioned. The court stated that considering these public records did not convert the dismissal motion into a motion for summary judgment.

Rule 12(b)(6) Standard

Defendants moved under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6), which permits dismissal when a complaint does not state a legally sufficient claim. At this stage, the court generally treated the complaint’s factual allegations as true and drew reasonable inferences for plaintiffs, but required facts making the claims plausible rather than merely possible. The court also stated that leave to amend generally should be granted when a complaint’s defects might be cured by amendment.

Hen Harbor’s Claims

Defendants argued that Hen Harbor’s allegations were inadequate. They contended, among other things, that the complaint did not allege speech by Hen Harbor, did not identify which plaintiff owned the property or animals, and did not allege that Hen Harbor was denied a post-seizure hearing. Plaintiffs responded that Huemer had acted individually, as a Hen Harbor official, and in both capacities since 2012.

The court found the allegations concerning Hen Harbor, which the complaint described as a California nonprofit corporation, adequate at the pleading stage. It therefore denied defendants’ motion to dismiss Hen Harbor’s claims.

First Amendment Retaliation

The First Cause of Action alleged that Sobel, Stosuy, and Montes retaliated against Huemer for criticizing the agency. Defendants argued that the claim failed because Huemer continued criticizing the agency after the raids and because the complaint did not adequately allege retaliatory intent.

The court rejected those arguments at the pleading stage. It held that plaintiffs did not have to allege that their speech had actually stopped; they needed to allege facts showing that the defendants’ actions could deter a person of ordinary firmness from future First Amendment activity. The court found that the alleged escalating actions, including the two raids and seizure of hundreds of birds and other animals, plausibly satisfied that requirement. It also found sufficient allegations that defendants acted because of Huemer’s public criticisms. The court denied the motion to dismiss the First Cause of Action.

Fourteenth Amendment Procedural Due Process

The Third Cause of Action alleged that the individual defendants deprived plaintiffs of property without procedural due process by seizing, injuring, killing, or losing hundreds of birds without a hearing before the seizures. Defendants argued that the complaint did not address California Penal Code section 597.1, which provides procedures for hearings before or after animal seizures depending on the circumstances.

The court noted that plaintiffs had received post-seizure hearings and that plaintiffs conceded that the named defendants were not liable under the Fourteenth Amendment for birds killed by County Shelter employees. Plaintiffs nevertheless argued that the claim could cover birds that disappeared and could cover Doe defendants allegedly involved in euthanizing birds.

The court concluded that defendants’ arguments did not eliminate the possibility that plaintiffs could state a Fourteenth Amendment claim, but found that the amended complaint did not match plaintiffs’ arguments. The complaint focused repeatedly on the absence of a pre-seizure hearing, while the parties’ arguments focused largely on post-seizure procedures. The complaint also alleged that individual defendants killed birds, despite plaintiffs’ concession concerning the named defendants. The court granted the motion to dismiss the Third Cause of Action with leave to amend so plaintiffs could clarify the basis of the claim.

Monell Liability

The Fourth Cause of Action sought to hold the agency liable under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 based on an agency policy or custom. A Monell claim is a claim that a local government caused a constitutional violation through its own policy, custom, inadequate training or supervision, or action by a final policymaker; the government cannot be held liable merely because it employs the person who allegedly committed the violation.

The court found the allegations insufficient. The complaint did not allege a pattern of similar constitutional violations, explain how inadequate training or supervision caused the alleged seizures or due-process violations, identify the substance of the agency’s policies or customs, show that those policies or customs were persistent or widespread, or adequately allege action or ratification by a policymaker. The court also found that merely failing to overrule or discipline a subordinate did not establish ratification. It granted the motion to dismiss the Monell claim against the agency with leave to amend.

State-Law Claims

Defendants sought dismissal of the Bane Act, conversion, strict-liability, and trespass claims based on California governmental immunities. Plaintiffs abandoned the strict-liability claim.

Because plaintiffs abandoned it, the court granted the motion to dismiss the Seventh Cause of Action for strict liability for bailors without leave to amend.

For the Bane Act, conversion, and trespass claims, defendants argued that the animal seizures were discretionary acts protected by California Government Code section 820.2. The court concluded that, although the decision to seize animals might be discretionary, plaintiffs’ claims also appeared to concern operational conduct, including how seized animals were handled and conduct during the raids that allegedly damaged Huemer’s carport. The court stated that such operational decisions were not protected by section 820.2 at this stage.

Defendants also invoked California Government Code section 821.6, which concerns injuries caused by instituting or prosecuting judicial or administrative proceedings. The court relied on Ninth Circuit and California Supreme Court authority limiting that immunity to malicious-prosecution actions and declined to extend it to the state-law tort claims at this stage. The court therefore denied the motion to dismiss the Fifth Cause of Action for violation of the Bane Act, the Sixth Cause of Action for conversion, and the Eighth Cause of Action for trespass to land.

Disposition

Judge Susan Van Keulen ordered that defendants’ motion to dismiss the First Amended Complaint was granted in part and denied in part. The motion to dismiss Hen Harbor’s claims was denied. The First Amendment retaliation claim was not dismissed. The Fourteenth Amendment procedural-due-process claim and the Monell claim were dismissed with leave to amend. The Bane Act, conversion, and trespass claims were not dismissed. The strict-liability claim was dismissed without leave to amend. Plaintiffs were permitted to file a Second Amended Complaint within 14 days of the order.