dela Cruz v. Brennan

Background

Fernando N. dela Cruz alleged one remaining claim under the Family and Medical Leave Act (FMLA), asserting that the United States Postal Service used his August 2016 leave as a negative factor in deciding to terminate him. Dela Cruz had worked for the Postal Service as a mail carrier from 2001 until his termination in January 2017. After his sister died in August 2016, his doctor placed him off work for five days. The Postal Service later warned, suspended, and terminated him. The stated reason for termination was falsifying scans of mailboxes, which Dela Cruz alleged was pretextual.

Louis DeJoy, the Postmaster General, moved for summary judgment. Summary judgment is appropriate only when there is no genuine dispute about a fact that could affect the outcome and the moving party is entitled to judgment under the law.

Evidentiary objections

The court denied as moot the objection to Anthony Jamero’s declaration because it did not rely on that declaration. The court overruled objections to Exhibits A and B to Sumagaysay’s declaration. The documents had been produced by Defendant in discovery, and Defendant did not otherwise challenge their authenticity or show that their contents could not be presented in an admissible form at trial. The court denied as moot DeJoy’s remaining objections to Dela Cruz’s evidence because it did not rely on the disputed evidence.

Analysis

DeJoy argued that summary judgment was warranted because Dela Cruz was not entitled to FMLA leave, did not provide adequate notice, was not terminated for taking leave, and filed his claim too late.

The court found a factual dispute about whether Dela Cruz had an FMLA-qualifying serious health condition. Although the medical record listed bereavement as one reason for his visit, it also listed insomnia and high blood fats. The doctor prescribed Trazodone and placed Dela Cruz off work from August 10 through August 14, 2016. The court concluded that this evidence could support a finding that Dela Cruz received treatment resulting in a continuing-treatment regimen and was incapacitated for more than three consecutive full calendar days.

The court also found a factual dispute about notice. Dela Cruz submitted a form requesting sick leave from August 10 through August 14 and submitted a work-status report stating that his doctor had placed him off work for five days. The court held that this evidence could support a finding that the Postal Service received the requests and had enough information to determine that the FMLA might apply. An employee does not have to mention the FMLA expressly when requesting leave.

There was also a factual dispute about whether the August leave was a negative factor in the termination decision. A warning letter cited attendance and 22 days of sick leave, and a report included the August 10–14 leave among the sick-leave occurrences. The supervisor later indicated that she considered prior discipline when recommending termination. In addition, evidence that management had not previously instructed carriers about the conduct underlying the stated termination reason, together with the supervisor’s statement that she had not disciplined other employees for similar conduct, could support a finding that the stated reason was pretextual.

Finally, the court found a factual dispute about whether the alleged FMLA violation was willful. Dela Cruz filed more than two years after his alleged termination, so the claim would be timely only if the three-year limitations period for a willful violation applied. The court concluded that the factual disputes—including whether the Postal Service failed to inquire about the leave and whether the termination reason was pretextual—also affected whether the alleged interference was willful and whether the action was timely.

Disposition

The court denied DeJoy’s motion for summary judgment. Judge Donna M. Ryu did not resolve the factual disputes or enter judgment on the FMLA claim.