Martinez v. County of Alameda

Background

Lisamaria Martinez sued Alameda County, Melissa Wilk, Eva He, and Maria Laura Briones. Her claims alleged violations of Title II and Title V of the Americans with Disabilities Act (ADA), the California Unruh Civil Rights Act, the Disabled Persons Act, and a request for declaratory relief.

The dispute arose from Martinez’s March 29, 2019 visit to the Alameda County Clerk-Recorder’s Office. She went there to file fictitious business name statements. A clerk told her that corrections were needed. Martinez, who is blind, asked for assistance making those corrections. The clerk and supervisor Briones declined because of a policy prohibiting Clerk-Recorder employees from completing or modifying patrons’ forms. Briones instead gave Martinez a letter explaining the needed corrections and a self-addressed envelope. Martinez returned on May 31, 2019, when she was able to file the statements.

Martinez moved for partial summary judgment and declaratory judgment. The defendants moved for summary judgment or, alternatively, partial summary judgment. Summary judgment is a decision without a trial when the record shows no genuine dispute over a fact that could affect the result and the moving party is entitled to judgment under the law.

Title II of the ADA

The court held that filing completed forms and advising patrons about technical deficiencies qualified as public services, programs, or benefits covered by Title II. The court also held that filling out or modifying forms was not itself a Clerk-Recorder service, program, activity, or benefit.

Martinez pursued two Title II theories: failure to provide a reasonable accommodation and disparate impact. On the reasonable-accommodation theory, she argued that the defendants should have provided an auxiliary aid or assistance to help her correct the statements. The court found genuine disputes of material fact about whether the defendants effectively communicated with Martinez, whether she made an appropriate accommodation request, and whether the defendants fulfilled their duty to determine what accommodation was necessary. Because those questions required fact-finding and credibility determinations, the court denied both parties’ motions for summary judgment on the reasonable-accommodation claims.

On the disparate-impact theory, Martinez argued that the Clerk-Recorder’s policy affected people with visual impairments because patrons without impairments could use the office’s in-person filing services. The court noted that the policy applied equally to all patrons, but explained that a neutral policy may still violate Title II if it denies people with disabilities meaningful access to public services. The court found factual disputes about whether Martinez was denied equal participation and whether alternatives such as mailing documents or planned software and kiosks provided meaningful access. It therefore denied both parties’ motions for summary judgment on the disparate-impact claims.

Title V claims

The defendants sought summary judgment on Martinez’s Title V claims against the individual defendants, arguing that individuals could not be held individually liable under that provision. The court agreed and held that individuals could not be held liable under Title V. The court also noted that Martinez did not address the defendants’ argument with supporting case law. The court granted the defendants’ motion for summary judgment on the Title V claims.

State-law claims

The defendants sought summary judgment on Martinez’s claims under the Unruh Act and the Disabled Persons Act. Because the court found factual disputes that prevented summary judgment on the Title II claims, it denied the defendants’ motion for summary judgment on the Unruh Act and Disabled Persons Act claims.

Declaratory judgment and disposition

Martinez asked the court to declare that the County’s refusal to read or transcribe paper forms for people with disabilities who could not otherwise access them violated Title II, determine that she was a prevailing party, and direct the parties to submit proposed orders concerning qualified-reader services. The court denied her request for declaratory judgment because the unresolved factual disputes meant there was not yet a sufficiently definite dispute for that relief.

The court denied Martinez’s Motion for Partial Summary Judgment and Declaratory Judgment. It granted the defendants’ Motion for Summary Judgment as to the Title V claims and denied the defendants’ motion as to the Title II, Unruh Act, and Disabled Persons Act claims. The opinion’s conclusion contains an apparent transcription error referring to “Title I]”; the discussion and the rest of the order consistently address Title II.