A. J. T. v. Osseo Area Schools, Independent School District No. 279

Background

A.J.T. has Lennox-Gastaut Syndrome, a severe form of epilepsy, diminished intellectual capacities, and seizures throughout the day. Since she entered the Osseo school district in 2015, the parties agreed that she could not begin school before noon because of her seizure activity. Her school day in the district generally ran from noon to 4:15 p.m., or 4.25 hours, rather than the 6.50-hour day her parents requested. The district provided intensive special-education services, including one-on-one or two-on-one assistance.

An administrative law judge previously found that the district had violated the Individuals with Disabilities Education Act (IDEA) and ordered it to provide eye-gaze technology, compensatory education hours, and other relief. In a prior related proceeding, this court affirmed that decision. A.J.T. and her parents then brought claims under the IDEA, Section 504 of the Rehabilitation Act, and the Americans with Disabilities Act (ADA). They also claimed that the district retaliated against A.J.T.’s parents for advocating for her.

The district moved for summary judgment. Summary judgment is entered when the record shows no genuine dispute over a fact that could affect the result and the moving party is entitled to judgment under the law. The plaintiffs argued that they were entitled to judgment or, alternatively, that factual disputes required a trial.

ADA and Section 504 claims

The court treated the ADA and Section 504 claims under the same general framework. For educational-services claims involving a disabled child, the court applied the requirement that the school officials acted with “bad faith or gross misjudgment.” That means the officials’ conduct must have departed substantially from accepted professional judgment, practices, or standards, showing that the decisions were not actually based on professional judgment.

The court assumed, without deciding, that A.J.T. had been denied the benefits of a federally funded public program and discriminated against because of her disability. It nevertheless held that the evidence did not show bad faith or gross misjudgment. The court relied on the district’s multiple individualized education program meetings, extension of A.J.T.’s school day beyond the ordinary elementary and middle school schedules, adoption of several recommendations from an independent educational evaluation, and provision of intensive assistance at school.

The court concluded that the district’s failure to provide extended home instruction was, at most, negligence. It also found that a special-education administrator’s recommendation that the parents hire a personal care attendant, although insensitive, did not meet the required standard. The court emphasized that a violation of the IDEA or an incorrect educational plan does not by itself establish discrimination under the ADA or Section 504.

Retaliation claims

The court assumed, without deciding, that the parents’ advocacy during the individualized education program process was protected activity. It held, however, that the plaintiffs had not shown that the district took adverse action because of that advocacy.

The court rejected the plaintiffs’ reliance on meetings, proposed individualized education programs, discussions of A.J.T.’s abilities, and the district’s handling of recommendations as evidence of retaliation. It noted that the district was required or permitted to use meetings and other dispute-resolution procedures, that the parents had requested additional meetings at relevant times, and that the district adopted several of the independent evaluator’s recommendations. The court also found insufficient support for claims that district employees became less communicative after the lawsuit or that scheduling decisions were made to punish the parents. The plaintiffs therefore failed to establish a causal connection between protected activity and retaliation.

IDEA claim

The plaintiffs alleged that the district failed to implement the administrative law judge’s decision, including its requirements concerning eye-gaze technology and compensatory education. The court held that the proper way to seek relief for an alleged violation of the earlier order was to file another motion asking the court to require the district to explain its conduct, not to bring a new IDEA claim in this action or another case.

The court also stated that, even assuming federal jurisdiction existed, the claim was filed 104 days after the administrative decision, beyond the IDEA’s 90-day deadline for appeals. In addition, the court held that the claim arose from the same transaction or occurrence as the earlier related case and should have been brought there as a compulsory counterclaim. Because it was not asserted there, the court concluded that the claim was barred.

Disposition

Judge Michael J. Davis granted the defendants’ Motion for Summary Judgment in full and ordered that judgment be entered. The opinion does not separately list individual judgments for each claim; the order grants the defendants’ motion as to the action.