Chung v. County of Santa Clara

Background

Daniel Chung, then a deputy district attorney for Santa Clara County, published a February 14, 2021, opinion piece in a local newspaper concerning criminal justice reform and violence against Asian Americans following the COVID-19 pandemic. The opinion states that Chung generally referred to his prosecutorial experience but did not specifically mention the County, the District Attorney’s Office, District Attorney Jeffrey Rosen, or any investigation, litigation, or proceeding in which he was participating.

Chung alleged that Rosen became angry after reading the article and directed Chief Assistant District Attorney Jay Boyarsky to punish him. According to the complaint, Chung received a discipline letter, was transferred to Mental Health Court and then Juvenile Justice, was suspended for 10 days, was placed on administrative leave and escorted from the District Attorney’s Office, was the subject of notices barring him from County property, and received an unpaid two-week suspension.

Chung sued the County and Rosen under 42 U.S.C. § 1983, alleging retaliation for exercising his First Amendment rights. In an earlier ruling, the court held that Chung had adequately alleged that he spoke as a private citizen, but had not adequately pleaded a claim against the defendants. The court then gave him another opportunity to amend. The County filed the motion decided in this order; Rosen did not.

Legal Standard

The County moved under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6), which requires dismissal when a complaint does not state a legally sufficient claim. To survive such a motion, a complaint must allege enough facts to make liability plausible, rather than merely possible or speculative. The court generally accepts well-pleaded allegations as true and draws reasonable inferences for the plaintiff, but need not accept conclusory allegations or unreasonable inferences.

Municipal Liability

Under Monell, a local government is not liable under § 1983 merely because one of its employees caused an injury. A plaintiff must connect the constitutional violation to an official policy, custom, or practice of the local government. The court identified three relevant ways to do that: showing a longstanding practice that functions as the government’s standard operating procedure; showing that the official who made the decision was the final policymaker under state law; or showing that a final policymaker delegated or ratified the relevant authority.

Longstanding Practice or Custom

The court held that Chung had not plausibly alleged a longstanding County practice or custom of retaliating against employees for speech. The complaint relied on Chung’s alleged retaliation and another employee’s alleged punishment, along with general allegations that Rosen and Boyarsky used tactics to punish lawyers who displeased them and overlooked misconduct by favored employees. The amended complaint identified other attorneys but provided no details about their alleged discipline, including whether they were punished because of speech or whether their treatment was similar to Chung’s and close enough in time to support an inference of a County practice.

The court also noted that Chung did not address the County’s argument about the longstanding-practice theory in his opposition. It concluded that, whether viewed as a failure to respond or on the substance, the allegations did not adequately support this theory of municipal liability.

Final Policymaking Authority

The court rejected Chung’s allegation that Rosen was the County’s final policymaker for employee discipline. It relied on the County Charter and Ordinance Code, which gave Rosen authority to appoint, suspend, or remove employees but subjected that authority to other provisions. The court had previously concluded that Rosen’s disciplinary decisions could be appealed and overturned and that the Board of Supervisors set County employment policy.

The court held that Rosen’s alleged testimony that he oversaw the District Attorney’s Office and set its policy and direction did not establish final policymaking authority over employment discipline. It also held that the allegations concerning Boyarsky’s role as chief assistant district attorney and his handling of disciplinary matters did not show that Boyarsky was the final policymaker. Having discretion to make decisions was not enough because final policymaking authority required decisions that were final, unreviewable, and not constrained by superior policies.

Delegation

The court also rejected Chung’s delegation theory. The amended complaint did not expressly allege that the County delegated final disciplinary policymaking authority to Rosen or that Rosen delegated such authority to Boyarsky. Chung relied in his opposition on the County Charter, County ordinances, County policies, and a collective bargaining agreement, but the court stated that a deficient complaint could not be repaired through allegations added only in an opposition brief.

Even considering those documents, the court found that they showed only some disciplinary authority, not delegated final policymaking authority. The County retained authority to review employee discipline through the County Personnel Board, whose decisions on appeals were described as final and conclusive. The court distinguished a prior case in which a school board had expressly renounced authority over employee discipline. It concluded that the County’s delegation of discretion to Rosen was not the same as delegation of final policymaking authority, and that Chung therefore could not establish a further delegation from Rosen to Boyarsky.

Disposition

The court concluded that Chung had not adequately alleged any theory of municipal liability against the County. Judge Hiam H. Orrick granted the County’s motion to dismiss with prejudice. The order did not decide the motion against Rosen because Rosen did not bring the motion at issue.