Huemer v. Santa Cruz County Animal Shelter Foundation

Background

The case arose from two raids on Hen Harbor in 2020. Hen Harbor is an animal rescue and rehabilitation organization founded by plaintiff Ariana Huemer. Plaintiffs Huemer and Eeyore’s Hen Harbor asserted seven causes of action in their Second Amended Complaint: First Amendment retaliation, unreasonable seizure under the Fourth Amendment, deprivation of property without procedural due process under the Fourteenth Amendment, municipal liability under 42 U.S.C. § 1983, violation of the Bane Act, conversion or intentional deprivation of property, and trespass to land.

The motion addressed only the fourth cause of action, the claim seeking to hold the Santa Cruz Animal Shelter (called the “Agency” in the opinion) liable under § 1983 for a policy or custom that caused constitutional violations. The defendants were the Agency and Individual Defendants Melanie Sobel, Todd Stosuy, and Carlos Montes. The defendants also argued that the Second Amended Complaint was filed one day late, but the court accepted the plaintiffs’ showing of excusable neglect and considered the complaint as timely.

Legal standard and parties’ arguments

To establish municipal liability under § 1983, plaintiffs had to allege that they had a constitutional right, that the Agency had a policy, that the policy reflected deliberate indifference to that right, and that the policy was the moving force behind the constitutional violation. A policy could be shown through an official policy, a widespread practice or custom, inadequate training or supervision, or an act or ratification by a final policymaker.

The defendants argued that the complaint did not adequately identify the relevant Agency policy or custom and did not show that it caused the alleged constitutional injuries. The plaintiffs’ allegations alternatively described policies that the Agency failed to adopt, constitutionally inadequate policies, policies that were disregarded as a custom, decisions by a policymaker, and failures to train, supervise, or discipline employees. The plaintiffs also argued that the court should reconsider its earlier dismissal of the same type of claim from the First Amended Complaint.

Court’s analysis

The court did not decide whether the plaintiffs’ allegations of a constitutional violation were adequate because the defendants assumed that point for purposes of the motion. Instead, the court held that the policy or custom allegations remained deficient.

Regarding inadequate training or supervision, the court found that the complaint alleged only conduct involving the plaintiffs during a single investigation. It did not allege similar incidents involving other people or facts showing that inadequate training or supervision caused the alleged unreasonable seizures or procedural due-process violations. The court held that the events, although occurring over time and involving several employees, did not show conduct of sufficient duration, frequency, and consistency to establish an Agency policy or custom.

The court rejected the plaintiffs’ reliance on cases involving multiple incidents affecting different people or allegations concerning nonparty victims. It explained that the allegations here concerned a single course of conduct involving the plaintiffs and therefore did not establish the broader practice required for municipal liability.

Regarding policymaker action or ratification, the court dismissed the claim to the extent it relied on Todd Stosuy as a final policymaker because the plaintiffs did not address that issue in their opposition. As to Melanie Sobel, the court found that her presence at the second raid, alleged inaction after receiving complaints, and title as general manager did not adequately establish ratification or policymaker status. The court explained that merely failing to overrule or discipline a subordinate does not amount to ratification, and that Sobel’s title alone was insufficient. The remaining allegations that Sobel knew of, approved, or helped develop Agency policies were conclusory and did not provide enough factual detail to support a reasonable inference of liability.

Disposition

The court granted the defendants’ motion to dismiss the Monell claim without leave to amend. It dismissed that claim with prejudice because the plaintiffs had three opportunities to plead it and had not shown that another amendment could cure the deficiencies. The court also set an initial case-management conference for November 8, 2022, and required a joint case-management statement by November 1, 2022.