Cortesluna v. Leon
- Jacquelyn Corley
- 3:17-cv-05133
- U.S. District Court · Northern District of California
- 10
In Cortesluna v. Leon, Judge Corley partly granted and partly denied defendants’ summary-judgment motion, leaving three matters against Rivas-Villegas unresolved.
Cortesluna’s claims against Union City and Officers Leon, Rivas-Villegas, and Kensic; the Bane Act, Monell ratification, and punitive-damages matters against Rivas-Villegas remained unresolved.
What happened
In Cortesluna v. Leon, Ramon Cortesluna sued the City of Union City and Officers Manuel Leon, Rivas-Villegas, and Kensic over a November 6, 2016 incident at his home. The defendants asked for summary judgment, which would resolve claims without a trial.
The court granted the motion as to Cortesluna’s state-law claims against Leon and Kensic, Rivas-Villegas’s Ralph Act and intentional emotional-distress claims, the Monell claim based on inadequate training or deliberate indifference, and the negligent hiring, training, and supervision claim. The court denied the motion as to the Bane Act claim against Rivas-Villegas, the Monell claim based on ratification, and punitive damages against Rivas-Villegas.
Judge Jacqueline Scott Corley ruled that the earlier appellate decision controlled the claims against Leon and Kensic, while factual disputes remained about Rivas-Villegas’s use of force and possible ratification by the police chief.
The detailed version
- Cortesluna v. Leon · No. 3:17-cv-05133
- Jacquelyn Corley
- Oct. 12, 2022
Background
Ramon Cortesluna brought civil-rights claims under state and federal law against the City of Union City and Union City Police Officers Manuel Leon, Rivas-Villegas, and Kensic. The claims arose from an incident at Cortesluna’s home on November 6, 2016. After the case was sent back from the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit, the defendants moved for partial summary judgment.
The court granted in part and denied in part the motion. Summary judgment is a ruling that resolves a claim when the evidence shows that no trial is needed to decide a material factual issue.
Claims Against Leon and Kensic
The court held that the law-of-the-case doctrine barred Cortesluna’s remaining state-law claims against Leon and Kensic. That doctrine generally requires a court to follow an issue already decided by the same court or a higher court in the same case, unless an established exception applies.
Cortesluna argued that Leon’s deposition testimony was new evidence showing that Leon saw the knife before shooting. The court rejected that argument because the testimony was from 2018 and therefore was not new. The court also concluded that the testimony did not change the Ninth Circuit’s determination that Leon’s use of force was reasonable. The court entered judgment in favor of Leon and Kensic on the state-law claims at issue.
Claims Against Rivas-Villegas
The court granted summary judgment on Cortesluna’s Ralph Act claim. The Ralph Act protects against violence or threats of violence motivated by political affiliation or another listed protected characteristic. The court found no evidence that Rivas-Villegas placed his knee on Cortesluna’s back because of Cortesluna’s race or gender.
The court denied summary judgment on the Bane Act claim. The Bane Act concerns interference, or attempted interference, with constitutional or statutory rights through threats, intimidation, or coercion. The defendants argued that Rivas-Villegas lacked the required specific intent. The court explained that recklessness can establish that intent and that the defendants conceded there were factual disputes about whether Rivas-Villegas’s use of force was reasonable. Those disputes could support a finding of recklessness.
The court granted summary judgment on the intentional infliction of emotional distress claim. It held that Rivas-Villegas’s conduct—holding Cortesluna in place with a knee on his back for no more than eight seconds while Cortesluna was handcuffed, disarmed, and officers retrieved the knife—was not extreme or outrageous as a matter of law under the circumstances described.
Monell Claim
A Monell claim seeks to hold a local government responsible for a constitutional violation caused by an official policy, established custom, deliberately indifferent failure to act, or ratification by a final policymaker. Cortesluna pursued ratification and inadequate-training or deliberate-indifference theories.
The court denied summary judgment on the ratification theory. Evidence showed that the police chief approved a post-incident commendation praising the officers’ coordination and decision-making, describing Rivas-Villegas’s work as great and the force as minimal. Drawing inferences in Cortesluna’s favor, a reasonable factfinder could conclude that the chief approved Rivas-Villegas’s use of force.
The court granted summary judgment on the inadequate-training or deliberate-indifference theory. It found no evidence of a pattern of similar constitutional violations, an obviously necessary training program, or a program-wide training deficiency. The court also found that the cited internal-affairs investigation did not support the claimed pattern.
Negligent Hiring, Training, and Supervision
The court granted summary judgment to Union City on Cortesluna’s negligent hiring, training, and supervision claim because Cortesluna did not oppose the defendants’ motion on that claim. The court treated the claim as abandoned.
Punitive Damages
The court ruled that punitive damages were unavailable against Leon and Kensic because Cortesluna had no viable claims against them. The court denied summary judgment as to punitive damages against Rivas-Villegas because the defendants conceded that a genuine factual dispute existed regarding the reasonableness of his use of force.
Disposition
The court granted in part and denied in part the defendants’ motion for summary judgment. It denied the motion as to the Bane Act claim against Rivas-Villegas, the Monell ratification theory as to Rivas-Villegas, and punitive damages against Rivas-Villegas. It granted the motion in all other respects. The court also granted Cortesluna’s administrative motion to file certain documents under seal to the extent specified in the defendants’ supporting declaration. The order stated that a jury trial was set for December 12, 2022, with a pretrial conference on November 17, 2022.
Read the full 10-page opinion on CourtListener, the free public archive maintained by the Free Law Project.